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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this
appeal pursuant to Title 7 8, Chapter 2a, Section 2(i) of the Utah
Code Annotated of 1953, as amended.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED;
1.

Transacting substantial and continuous business

activity within the forum state:

Whether a resident of England,

Mr. Mori, who furnished aid to his former wife by helping her
purchase a home for her exclusive use and by paying child support
through a Utah bank was "transacting substantial and continuous
business activity" in Utah thereby, submitting

himself to the

general jurisdiction of the district court?
Standard of Review. The trial court's conclusions of law
should not be provided any particular deference and should be
reviewed for correctness.

The court of appeals is free to render

its own independent interpretation of legislative intent and
statutory applications on matters of law. (Steele v. Breinholt,
747 P.2d 433, 334-35 (Utah App. 1987)).

2.

Transacting any business in the State:

Whether Mrs.

Mori's claim to recognize a Japanese divorce decree in Utah arose
from (1) her former husband's help in purchasing her a home in
Utah or (2) his payment of child support through a Utah bank;
thereby, submitting Mr. Mori, a resident of England, to the
specific personal jurisdiction of the district court pursuant to
1

Utah's long-arm statutef Utah Code 1953 section 78-27-24(1)?
Standard of Review. The trial court's conclusions of law
should not be provided any particular deference and should be
reviewed for correctness.

The court of appeals is free to render

its own independent interpretation of legislative intent and
statutory applications on matters of law. (Steele v. Breinholt,
747 P.2d 433, 334-35 (Utah App. 1987)).

3.

The ownership, use or possession of any real estate

situated in this state;

Whether Mrs. Mori's claim to recognize a

Japanese divorce decree in Utah arose from her former husband's
name being among three other persons as a co-tenant on the deed
to the title of a home in which Mrs. Mori lives thereby
submitting her former husband, a resident of England, to the
specific personal jurisdiction of the district court pursuant to
Utah's long-arm statute, Utah Code 1953 section 78-27-24(4)?
Standard of Review. The trial court's conclusions of law
should not be provided any particular deference and should be
reviewed for correctness.

The court of appeals is free to render

its own independent interpretation of legislative intent and
statutory applications on matters of law. (Steele v. Breinholt,
747 P.2d 433, 334-35 (Utah App. 1987)).

4.

Having resided, in the marital relationship, within

this state:

Whether Mrs. Mori's claim to recognize a Japanese

divorce decree in Utah arose because the parties tarried in Utah
for the first ten (10) days of their marriage, and visited
2

relatives in Utah together two years after their marriage given
these facts, did Mr. Mori, a resident of England, submit himself
to the specific personal jurisdiction of the district court by
having resided in the marital relationship within the state as
provided by Utah's long-arm statute, Utah Code Ann. Section 7827-24(6)?
Standard of Review. The trial court's conclusions of law
should not be provided any particular deference and should be
reviewed for correctness.

The court of appeals is free to render

its own independent interpretation of legislative intent and
statutory applications on matters of law. (Steele v. Breinholt,
747 P.2d 433, 334-35 (Utah App. 1987)).

5.

Permitting alternative service of process and

enlargements of time:

Whether there was insufficient foundation

to have Mr. Mori, a resident of England, served by alternative
service and to permit enlargements of time for service of
process?
Standard of Review. This writer has attempted to cite a Utah
case which recites the standard of review for a Rule 4 issue.
While the reported Utah cases do not specifically provide a
standard of review, it is believed the proper standard of review
is that the district court's ruling should be reviewed for
correctness.

(See, Carlson v. Bos, 740 P.2d 1269 (Utah 1987)).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE
3

This is an appeal from the interlocutory order dated the
12th of April, 1994.
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW
Plaintiff filed a complaint in January of 1991.

Plaintiff's

cause of action, or claim, was to recognize a divorce decree
which was obtained in Tokyo, Japan.

Defendant was not served

within the time limit prescribed by Utah's Rules of Civil
Procedure.

The case was dismissed for lack of prosecution in

August of 1991.

Plaintiff moved on the 28th of September, 1991

to set aside the district court's Order of Dismissal for failure
to prosecute.
Dismissal.

The district court set aside its Order of

Plaintiff moved for enlargements of time to

effectuate service of process.
Defendant is a resident of England.

Defendant appeared

specially to challenge the exercise of jurisdiction.

The

district court denied the challenges to jurisdiction and
concluded that Mr. Mori, a resident of England, had submitted
himself to the general jurisdiction of the district court.

The

district court went on to find that the court could find that Mr.
Mori had submitted himself to specific personal jurisdiction
pursuant to Utah's long-arm statute.

Defendant Mr. Mori appeals

the district court's interlocutory order.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

The parties were married in Utah on April 23, 1983.

Record at 201.
2.

The parties left Utah on May 3, 19 83 to live in New

York to attend graduate school.

Record at 194 and 219.
4

3.

In 1985, Mrs. Mori went to Utah to stay with Mr. Mori's

parents before the parties moved to Japan.
4.

Mr. Mori joined his wife in Utah for three days prior

to leaving for Japan.
5.

Record at 219.

One child was conceived and born to the parties while

they lived in Japan.
6.

Record at 219.

The parties were divorced by order of the Tokyo Family

Court on June 1, 1987.
7.

Record at 194.

Record at 17 8.

After the divorce, Mrs. Mori moved to Utah to live in

the house Mr. Mori helped purchase for her.

Record at 218.

8*

Mr. Mori moved from Tokyof Japan to England.

Record at

9.

Mr. Mori maintains a joint bank account with his father

193.

in Utah through which he pays support to Mrs. Mori.

Record at

360.
10.

Mrs. Mori filed the Complaint of this matter, on or

about the 9th day of January, 1991, requesting Utah to adopt the
Japanese divorce decree.

The following procedural events

occurred:
9 January

1991

Complaint filed. (Record at
2).

9 January

1991

Affidavit of Brian Harrison to
support service of process by
mail. (Record at 6 ) .

9 January

1991

Order to Attach Divorce Decree
and Allow Service of Process
by Mail under Rule 4(f)(3).
(Record at 4 ) .

17 January

1991

Proof of Mailing to London,
England but no return receipt
ever received. (Record at

18). Plaintiff's counsel
originally filed an inquiry
about the mailing but then
later advised the court that
he did not want to continue
the inquiry. (Note on record
January 13, 1992 (Record at
32)).
11 July

1991

Order to Show Cause why the
case should not be dismissed
for failure to prosecute under
Rule 4-103 of the Utah Code of
Judicial Administration.
(Record at 20).

19 August

1991

Order of Dismissal for failure
to prosecute under Rule 4-103
of the Utah Code of Judicial
Administration because neither
party appeared to contest the
dismissal at the hearing for
the order to show cause.
(Record at 21).

28 September

1991

Plaintiff's Motion to Set
Aside Order of Dismissal.
(Record at 25).

24 October

1991

Order to set aside dismissal
of the 19th of August, 1991
entered. (Record at 2 7 ) .

17 December

1992

Plaintiff's Motion to Enlarge
Time for service of summons.
(Record at 36).

17 December

1992

Plaintiff's Memorandum of
Points and Authorities
supporting Motion to Enlarge
Time for service of summons.
(Record at 39).

17 December 1992

Affidavit of Brian Harrison in
support of Motion to Enlarge
Time for service of summons.
(Record at 42).

27 January

Ruling which granted
Plaintiff's Motion to Enlarge
Time for service of summons to
April 1, 1993. (Record at 4 4 ) .

1993

12.

15 April

1993

Plaintiff's second Motion to
Enlarge Time for service of
summons. (Record at 61).

21 April

1993

Plaintiff's Memorandum of
Points and Authorities
requesting that Plaintiff be
allowed to serve Defendant at
his office by serving his
secretary or receptionist or
his wife. (Record at 65).

22 April

1993

Order permitting Plaintiff to
Enlarge Time for service of
summons to 21 July 1993 and to
serve summons on Defendant's
secretary, receptionist or
wife. (Record at 70).

On the 21st day of May, 1993r Mr. Mori's counsel made a

special appearance for the sole purpose to question the
jurisdiction of the court and to quash service of process.
(Record at 78).
13.

On the 18th of June, 1993, Defendant made a special

appearance for the purpose to challenge the personal jurisdiction
of the court and to strike plaintiff's counsel's affidavit to
support service by alternative means. (Record at 111).
14.

On the 9th of September 1993, the court denied

defendant's challenge to the exercise of personal jurisdiction
and accepted service of process as sufficient to satisfy Rule 4
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure despite the procedural
events outlined in No. 11.
15.

(Record at 181).

On the 24th of September, 1993. Plaintiff specially

appeared to challenge the district court's jurisdiction to adopt
the Tokyo divorce decree. (Record at 184).
16.

In a Memorandum Decision dated February 16, 1994, the

trial court denied Mr. Mori's challenge to the court's
jurisdiction.

The court found that Mr. Mori, a resident of

Englandf had submitted himself to the general personal
jurisdiction of the district court.

(Record at 243).

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
This appeal requires the understanding of the following two
concepts:
(1) General personal jurisdiction.

This is a concept where

a nonresident defendant submits himself to the jurisdiction of
the forum because the nonresident has conducted "substantial and
continuous" activity in the forum.

If the nonresident

defendant's activities arise to this level, a state court may
exercise personal jurisdiction in actions related or unrelated to
these substantial and continuous local activities.
(2) Specific personal jurisdiction.

This is a concept where

the nonresident defendant submits himself to the personal
jurisdiction of the forum because plaintiff's claim or cause of
action, arose from the acts of the nonresident which are
enumerated in the state's long-arm statute.
General personal jurisdiction may not be exercised over Mr.
Mori, a resident of Englandf because the contacts he has with the
State of Utah do not rise to the standards of due process as
interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court.

Mr. Mori's contacts with

this state are not continuous, systematic or substantial.
Specific personal jurisdiction over Mr. Mori, a resident of
England, may not be exercised pursuant to any provision of Utah's
8

long-arm statute in an action brought by his former wife to have
the Utah court register a Tokyo, Japan divorce decree because the
claim, or cause of actionf did not "arise from" any of the
activities enumerated in Utah's long-arm statute.
The district court did not have personal jurisdiction over
Mr. Mori pursuant to Utah's Rules of Civil Procedure because the
necessary foundation was not established to permit alternative
service of process or enlargement of time for service of process.

ARGUMENT
INTRODUCTION
There exists fundamental principles to which adherence is
required in order to maintain the viability of the legal system's
structure.

Due process is the cornerstone of Anglo-American

jurisprudence.

Upon the principle of due process rests the

proper exercise of the court's jurisdiction.
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution requires that a state have personal
jurisdiction over a defendant before an action can be maintained.
The U.S. Supreme Court has addressed the circumstances under
which a state court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a
nonresident defendant.

Beginning with International Shoe v.

Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), the U.S. Supreme Court has
provided, as a prerequisite to a civil action, there must be
certain "minimum contacts" with the forum before the court may
exercise personal jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant.
The State of Utah has imposed limits on the exercise of personal
9

jurisdiction over nonresidents.

First, section 7 of the Utah

Constitution resounds the proclamation made in the U.S.
Constitution that an individual will not be deprived of due
process of law. (Utah Const. Art 1 § 7 (1896)).

Second, the Utah

State Legislature has enacted the long-arm statute which governs
the state court's authority to exercise specific personal
jurisdiction over nonresident defendants. (Utah Code Ann. § 7827-24).

In so far as nonresident defendants are concerned,

assertions of specific personal jurisdiction must satisfy the
provisions of Utah's long-arm statute and comport with due
process.
The case of Abbott G.M. Diesel v. Piper Aircraft, 578 P.2d
850 (Utah 1978) f is helpful in distinguishing between general and
specific personal jurisdiction.

The Utah Supreme Court said at

page 853 footnote 6:
General personal jurisdiction is the concept
reflected in a doing business statute, which requires
substantial and continuous local activity; specific
jurisdiction is the concept applicable to a long-arm
statute, which requires only minimum local contacts . .
. Where a defendant's forum-state activity is
extensive, the forum may assert personal jurisdiction
on either related or unrelated claims (doing business
concept). Where the defendant has only minimum
contacts with the forum, personal jurisdiction may be
asserted only on claims
arising
out of the defendant's
forum-state activity (long-arm or 'transaction of
business concept').
(Underlined added; Italics original).
The federal district court of Utah has outlined a three-step
analysis for determining the existence of specific personal
jurisdiction under Utah's long-arm statute.

In Romney v. St.

John Virgin Grand Villas A s s o c , 734 F.S. 957 (D. Utah 1990), the
10

court set forth the process for a state court to follow in order
to acquire specific personal jurisdiction under Utah's long-arm
statute.

The court said at pages 959-60:

The first step is to determine whether the facts
meet one of the statute's specifically enumerated acts.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-24 (1987) reads in part . . . .
The second step is to determine whether the
"plaintiff's claim arises out of the defendant's
performance of one of the statute's specifically
enumerated acts." (cite omitted).
The third step is to "determine whether the
assertion of jurisdiction is consistent with federal
due process limitations." (cite omitted). "[T]he
constitutional touchstone" of the determination whether
an exercise of personal jurisdiction comports with due
process remains whether the defendant purposefully
established 'minimum contacts' in the forum state."
(cites omitted).
(Emphasis added).
The following arguments address the findings and conclusions
reached by the district court in the present case. The arguments
point out why the court neither has general personal jurisdiction
nor specific personal jurisdiction. And why there was
insufficient foundation to permit alternative service of process
and enlargement of time for service of process.

POINT I.
TRANSACTING SUBSTANTIAL AND CONTINUOUS BUSINESS ACTIVITY WITHIN
THE FORUM STATE: MR. MORI, A RESIDENT OF ENGLAND, WHO FURNISHED
AID TO HIS FORMER WIFE BY HELPING HER PURCHASE A HOME FOR HER
EXCLUSIVE USE AND WHO PAID CHILD SUPPORT THROUGH A UTAH BANK WAS
NOT "TRANSACTING SUBSTANTIAL AND CONTINUOUS BUSINESS ACTIVITY" IN
UTAH AND THEREFORE DID NOT SUBMIT HIMSELF TO THE GENERAL
JURISDICTION OF THE DISTRICT COURT.
A.
Mr. Mori's aid to his former wife to help her purchase a
home for her exclusive use is not substantial and continuous
11

local activity and therefore, does not give the court general
personal jurisdiction in an action to recognize a divorce decree
adjudicated in a foreign nation.
The district court concluded that Mr* Mori submitted himself
to the jurisdiction of the court.

The district court

specifically found that it could exercise general personal
jurisdiction over Mr. Mori.

The district court went on to find

that it could exercise specific personal jurisdiction over Mr.
Mori because he helped Mrs. Morif after the divorce, purchase a
home in Orem, Utah for her exclusive use.

The district court

said at page 8 with regard to specific personal jurisdiction by
saying:
Even if the Court could not find general personal
jurisdiction the Court could find specific personal
jurisdiction [pursuant to the long-arm statute] on the
claim of the Plaintiff as it relates to the ownership
of the Orem home as this arises out of a particular
activity of the Defendant in the [S]tate of Utah.
(Emphasis added).
The doctrine of general personal jurisdiction requires that
a nonresident defendant to have contacts with the forum state "so
substantial and of such a nature" that the state may assert
jurisdiction over the nonresident where the claim being asserted
is unrelated to any of the acts enumerated in the long-arm
statute. (See, International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,
318 (1945)).

The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that the degree

of contacts with the forum must be "continuous and systematic" to
justify the assertion of general personal jurisdiction over
unrelated causes of action.

(Helicopteros Nacionales de

Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 416 (1984)).
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Thus, general

personal jurisdiction could be labeled as a dispute blind.
In Helicopteros Nacionales, the plaintiff filed a wrongful
death claim in Texas state court.

The claim arose when a

helicopter crash in Peru causing the deaths of American employees
of a Texas-based joint venture.

The Texas court based its

exercise of jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant because
(1) the defendant had negotiated the joint venture with plaintiff
in Texas; (2) defendant, over a period of eight months, had
purchased 80% of its helicopters and a substantial quantity of
spare parts out of Texas; (3) defendant sent its pilots for
training in Texas; (4) defendant sent technicians to Texas for
consultations; (5) defendant accepted checks which were drafted
on a Texas bank. (Id. at 410-11).

But, nevertheless, the U.S.

Supreme court held that the defendant's contacts with the state
were not continuous and systematic and therefore, the state court
could not assert general personal jurisdiction over the
nonresident defendant. (See, Helicopteros Nacionales in
Appendix).
The district court in the present case found that it could
exercise general personal jurisdiction.

The activities which the

court relied upon for the exercise of general personal
jurisdiction were that (1) Mr. Mori's aided his former spouse in
purchasing a home for her use after the divorce and (2) he
maintained a joint checking account through which child support
was paid.

These activities are minor when compared with the

activities carried on by Helico in Helicopteros Nacionales de
Colombia, S.A..

The activities by Helico were considerably more
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substantial and continuous when compared to Mr. Mori's minimal
activities.
B.
Mr. Mori, a resident of England, did not submit himself to
the general personal jurisdiction of the district court by
maintaining a checking account at a Utah bank through which child
support was paid because maintaining a checking does not
constitute substantial and continuous local activity.
The district court concluded that the exercise of general
personal jurisdiction was proper because the "[d]efendant is
conducting substantial and continuous activity in the state of
Utah." (Record at 357). The district court based its conclusion
on the fact that Mr. Mori helped purchase a home for his ex-wife
in Orem, Utah and that Mr. Mori was an alternate signor on a
checking account in a Utah bank from which child support was
paid. (Record at 358).
In Arguello v. Industrial Woodworking Machine Co., 838 P.2d
1120 (Utah 1992) , the court explained at page 1122:
General personal jurisdiction permits a court to
exercise power over a Defendant without regard to the
subject of the claim asserted. For such jurisdiction
to exist, the Defendant must be conducting substantial
and continuous local activity in the forum state. In
contrast, specific personal jurisdiction gives a court
power over a Defendant only with respect to claims
arising out of the particular activities of the
Defendant in the forum state.
(Emphasis added).
Helping a former wife purchase a home for her exclusive use
after the divorce and maintaining a joint checking account with a
third party are not substantial and continuous local activity
and, thereforef insufficient to support the exercise of general
personal jurisdiction over a resident of England.
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C.
Mrs. Mori's intention to move from Tokyo, Japan to reside in
Orem, Utah did not submit Mr. Mori, a resident of England, to the
general personal jurisdiction of the district court because her
activities or intentions cannot submit him to the jurisdiction.
The district court relied upon the fact the parties
anticipated, at the time of the divorce decree, that Mrs. Mori
would move from Japan and reside in Utah after the divorce.

The

district court said:
The Japan Divorce Decree contemplates the Plaintiff and
the child of the parties would live in the [S]tate of
Utah.
(Record at 359).
The future domicile of a former spouse has no bearing upon
conferring general personal jurisdiction over the other spouse.
The U.S. Supreme Court case of Kulko v. Superior Court of
California, 436 U.S. 84 (1978), is helpful in determining how a
change of residence of a former wife effects her former husband.
In Kulko, the marital domicile of the parties was in the State of
New York.

Mr. and Mrs. Kulko were divorced in Haiti.

After the

divorce, Mrs. Kulko moved to California. Under the separation
agreement signed in New York, their daughter lived with Mr. Kulko
in New York.

A short time later, the daughter asked her father

if he would consent to her living in California with her mother.
Mr. Kulko consented to her move.
The U.S. Supreme Court found that the former wife's move
from New York to California and the husband's acquiescence in his
daughter's request to live in California with her mother was not
an act which would put a reasonable person on notice that he
might be haled before a California court.
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(Id. at 94 and

appendix).
Foreseeability alone is constitutionally insufficient to
establish a benchmark for personal jurisdiction.

In Worldwide

Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 100 S.Ct. 559 (1980), the U.S.
Supreme Court reviewed its prior decisions in which
foreseeability was an insufficient support for personal
jurisdiction.

The U.S. Supreme Court said at page 566:

In Hanson v. Denckla, [357 U.S. 235 (1958)], it was no
doubt foreseeable that the settlor of a Delaware trust
would subsequently move to Florida and seek to exercise
a power of appointment there; yet we held that Florida
courts could not constitutionally exercise jurisdiction
over a Delaware trustee that had no other contacts with
the forum State. In Kulko v. California Superior
Court, 436 U.S. 98 (1978)f the U.S. Supreme Court
pointed out that it was foreseeable that a divorced
wife would move to California from New York, the
domicile of the marriage, and that a minor daughter
would live with the mother. However, the U.S. Supreme
Court held that California could not exercise
jurisdiction in a child support action over the former
husband who had remained in New York.
At the end of the parties' marriage, Mrs. Mori decided to
return to live in the United States.
Utah the situs of her new home.

She decided to make Orem,

Although the Tokyo Japan divorce

decree contemplated her move to Utah, her move was a unilateral
activity.

The U.S. Supreme Court has addressed the question of

what effect one's party's unilateral activity might have on
another party with respect to the exercise of personal
jurisdiction.
In Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, 104 S.Ct. 1868, 1873
(1984), the state court attempted to stretch the principles of
due process by basing, in part, its exercise of personal
jurisdiction over the defendant because the nonresident defendant
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had accepted checks drawn on state bank in its business
negotiations with the plaintiff.

The U.S. Supreme Court,

rejecting the finding of the district court, said:
[U]nilateral activity of another party or a third
person is not an appropriate consideration when
determining whether a defendant has sufficient contacts
with a forum state to justify an assertion of

jurisdiction.

See Kulko

v. California

Superior

Court,

436 U.S. 84, 93 (arbitrary to subject one parent to
suit in any State where other parent chooses to spend
time while having custody of child pursuant to
separation agreement).
(Underlined added; Italics original).
Mr. Mori had not submitted himself to the general personal
jurisdiction of the district court.

Any of Mrs. Mori's

intentions or unilateral activities cannot support the exercise
of general personal jurisdiction over Mr. Mori.

POINT II.
TRANSACTING ANY BUSINESS WITHIN THE STATE; MRS. MORI'S CLAIM TO
RECOGNIZE A JAPANESE DIVORCE DECREE IN UTAH DID NOT ARISE FROM
(1) HER FORMER HUSBAND'S AID IN HELPING HER PURCHASING A HOME IN
UTAH OR (2) HIS PAYMENT OF CHILD SUPPORT THROUGH A UTAH BANK AND
THEREFORE, HER FORMER SPOUSEf A RESIDENT OF ENGLAND, DID NOT
SUBMIT HIMSELF TO THE SPECIFIC PERSONAL JURISDICTION OF THE
DISTRICT COURT PURSUANT TO UTAH'S LONG-ARM STATUTE, UTAH CODE
1953 SECTION 78-27-24(1).
In the present case, the district court said at page 7 of
the Amended Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions at Law:
78-27-24 [Utah Code Annotated]
"Any person,
not withstanding Section 16-10a-1501, whether or not a
citizen or resident of this state, who in person or
through an agent does any of the following enumerated
acts, submits himself, and if an individual, his
personal representative, to the jurisdiction of the
court of this state as to any claim arising from:
(1) the transacting of any business within this
SLaLc,

.

. .
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It is clear the Defendant has transacted business
in the state of Utah subsequent to the marriage of the
parties. The Defendant either personally or through an
agent contracted to purchase a home in Orem, Utah. The
Defendant personally or through his agent makes the
monthly payments on the home in Utah. The Defendant
sends monthly child support payments to the Plaintiff
by way of checks drawn on Zions Bank of Salt Lake City,
Utah. The Plaintiff and the child of the parties live
in the home purchased by the parties during the course
of their marriage.
(Record at 359).
Subsection (1) of Section 78-27-24 applies to cases arising
from the "transaction of any business within this State."

This

section of the long-arm statute may allow the exercise of
specific personal jurisdiction over a nonresident if the specific
claim, or cause of action, is directly related to the nonresident
defendant's activity.

The case of Roskelly & Co. v. Lerco, Inc.,

610 P,2d 1307 (Utah 1980), is helpful in determining what
activities give rise to the exercise of specific personal
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant.
In Roskelley, plaintiff brought an action against a
nonresident alleging breach of a contract to pay commission fees
to plaintiff for its services in connection with the sale of
goods by defendant for use in Utah.

The Supreme Court held that

Utah courts could not exercise specific personal jurisdiction
over a nonresident defendant where defendant's purposeful
activities within the State consisted of the sale of equipment
which was installed in Utah and defendant's visits to Utah for
the purpose of overseeing the installation because the
plaintiff's cause of action was not closely related to
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defendant's activities in Utah.

The Supreme Court was not

convinced that the exercise of jurisdiction would comport with
the requirements of due process owed the nonresident defendant
under the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. (Id. at
1313).
In the present case, the district court, after finding it
had general jurisdictionf went on to find that even if general
jurisdiction was unobtainable, the court could exercise specific
personal jurisdiction over Mr. Mori. (Record at 358). The
exercise of specific personal jurisdiction is not blind to
plaintiff's claim or cause of action.

Specific personal

jurisdiction may only be properly exercised if the claimf or
cause of actionf arises from the specific enumerated activity of
the nonresident defendant.

Mr. Mori's aid to his wife in

purchasing a home and his status of alternate signor on a
checking account through which he pays child support do not
arises from, nor are these activities directly related to f Mrs.
Mori's compliant which solely prays for the recognition of the
Japanese divorce decree.

Without a direct relationship between

the claim and the activities, Mr. Mori has not submitted himself
to the specific personal jurisdiction of the district court.
POINT III.
THE OWNERSHIP, USE OR POSSESSION OF ANY REAL ESTATE SITUATED IN
THIS STATE; MRS. MORI'S CLAIM TO RECOGNIZE A JAPANESE DIVORCE
DECREE IN UTAH DID NOT ARISE FROM HER FORMER HUSBAND'S NAME BEING
AMONG THREE OTHER PERSONS AS A CO-TENANT ON THE DEED TO THE TITLE
OF A HOME IN WHICH MRS. MORI LIVES AND THEREFORE, HER FORMER
HUSBAND, A RESIDENT OF ENGLAND, DID NOT SUBMIT HIMSELF TO THE
SPECIFIC PERSONAL JURISDICTION OF THE DISTRICT COURT PURSUANT TO
UTAH'S LONG-ARM STATUTE, UTAH CODE 1953 SECTION 78-27-24(4).
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A,
Mrs, Mori's action to recognize a Japanese divorce decree
does not arise from Mr, Mori's interest in real property and
therefore, Mr, Mori did not submit himself specific personal
jurisdiction of the district court.
The district court found that Mr. Mori was subject to
specific personal jurisdiction under Utah's long-arm statute
because he has an interest in real estate located in Orem, Utah.
(Record at 357). Whether Mr. Mori has an interest in real estate
in Orem, Utah is only one prong of the analysis in determining
the proper exercise of specific personal jurisdiction.
The district court confused two concepts: specific personal
jurisdiction and an alleged breach of a contract made in a
foreign country.

The district court said:

The Court finds the Defendant is conducting substantial
and continuous activity in the [S]tate of Utah. Even
if the Court could not find general personal
jurisdiction[,] the Court could find specific personal
jurisdiction on the claim of Plaintiff as it relates to
the ownership of the Orem home as this arises out of a
particular activity of the Defendant in the [S]tate of
Utah. (Record at 358).
Plaintiff's complaint seeks no relief for breach of contract
regarding the Orem home.

Plaintiff's cause of action, or claim,

is to adopt the Tokyo Japan divorce decree in Utah.

There are no

other claims, express or implied, in plaintiff's complaint.

The

sole claim and prayer in plaintiff's complaint is as follows:
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays that the [Tokyo Japan]
divorce decree be registered in the above-entitled
Court. (Complaint at 2 ) .
How did Mr. Mori, a resident of England, submit himself to
the specific personal jurisdiction of the district court because
the parties allegedly agreed in Tokyo that Mr. Mori would help
his former wife purchase real estate in Utah?
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The district court

failed to recognize the distinction between the exercise of
specific personal jurisdiction over a nonresident in an action to
recognize a foreign-nation divorce decree and the exercise of
rem

in

jurisdiction over a nonresident in an action to quiet title

to real estate.
The case of Willis v. Willis, 655 F.2d 1333 (D.C. 1981), is
helpful in dealing with the question of unrelated claims and the
exercise of specific personal jurisdiction.

In Willis, defendant

filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.
Plaintiff objected to defendant's Motion to Dismiss by arguing
that defendant had an interest in real property in the forum
state and that defendant had paid notes secured by deeds of trust
on that property in the forum state. (Id. at 1337).

The

appellate court decided that the district court erroneously
determined that the defendant's interest in real estate in the
forum provided a sufficient basis to assert personal jurisdiction
to all the plaintiff's claims notwithstanding all of the
plaintiff's claims were not related to that real estate. (Id. at
1336).

The appellate court said at page 1336:

Section 13-423(b) of the District of Columbia long arm
statute provides that "[w]hen jurisdiction over a
person is based solely upon this [long arm] section,
only a claim for relief arising from acts enumerated in
this section may be asserted against him." The
District of Columbia courts have interpreted section
13-423(b) as a bar to claims unrelated to the acts
forming a basis for personal jurisdiction. (cites
omitted). Because [plaintiff]'s remaining claims
against [the defendant] neither derived from nor are
connected with [the defendant]'s interest in the real
estate, we find that the District erred in relying on
the real estate as a basis for asserting in
personam
jurisdiction over Tthe defendant] with respect to the
other unrelated claims.
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(Emphasis added).
Mrs. Mori's claim to adopt the Tokyo Japan divorce decree in
Utah is unrelated to the fact that Mr. Mori has an interest in
real estate in Utah.

The district court's reliance on the fact

that he has an interest in real estate to assert specific
personal jurisdiction was misplaced.
B.

Plaintiff ought not be permitted to "bootstrap" claims.
Section 78-27-24 of the Utah Code Annotated 1953, as

amended, provides a limited number of circumstances when the
court may exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident.

This section

of the Utah Code provides in material part:
Any person . . . whether or not a citizen or resident
of this state . . . does any of the following
enumerated acts, submits himself . . . to the
jurisdiction of the court of this state as to any claim
arising from [one or more of the enumerated acts].
(Emphasis added).
There is an attempt in this case to use the facts that (1)
Mr. Mori has an interest in real estate in Utah and (2) is an
alternate signor on a joint checking account through which child
support is paid to conclude that Mr. Mori has submitted himself
to specific personal jurisdiction of the district court.

This

attempt fails because it tries to bootstrap claims which are not
impliedly or expressly a part of this action.

Those facts are

unrelated to this cause of action, which is to recognize a
Japanese divorce decree in Utah, and cannot be bootstrapped in
order to support the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction.
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The case of Baldwin v. Easterlinq, 754 P.2d 942 (Utah 1988) f
is helping in dealing with a case where the plaintiff attempted
to bootstrap unrelated claims.

The plaintiff mother in Baldwin

brought an action for paternity and breach of promise to marry
against a nonresidentf putative father.

The Supreme Court of

Utah rejected the bootstrapping of claims.

The Utah Supreme

Court said at page 945:
Section 7 8-27-24 [Utah's long arm statute] provides
that a nonresident submits himself to the jurisdiction
of the Utah courts "as to any claim arising from" the
acts there enumerated. [Plaintiff]'s claim does not
"arise from" any misrepresentation regarding payment of
return air fare, (cites omitted). fSIhe cannot
bootstrap onto any claim for misrepresentation her
separate and distinct statutory paternity action.
Jurisdiction over a nonresident for one claim of a
plaintiff does not generally confer jurisdiction over
the nonresident for other claims that plaintiff may
have.
(Emphasis added).
In the present case, the district court concluded that
specific personal jurisdiction could be found "on the claim of
the Plaintiff as it relates to the ownership of the Orem home as
this arises out of a particular activity of the Defendant in the
state of Utah." (Record at 358). However, this conclusion is not
consistent with Baldwin.
POINT IV.
HAVING RESIDED, IN THE MARITAL RELATIONSHIP, WITHIN THIS STATE;
MRS. MORI'S CLAIM TO RECOGNIZE A JAPANESE DIVORCE DECREE IN UTAH
DID NOT ARISE BECAUSE THE PARTIES TARRIED IN UTAH FOR THE FIRST
TEN (10) DAYS OF THEIR MARRIAGE, AND VISITED RELATIVES IN UTAH
TOGETHER TWO YEARS AFTER THEIR MARRIAGE. GIVEN THESE FACTS, MR.
MORI, A RESIDENT OF ENGLAND, DID NOT SUBMIT HIMSELF TO THE
SPECIFIC PERSONAL JURISDICTION OF THE DISTRICT COURT PURSUANT TO
UTAH'S LONG-ARM STATUTE, UTAH CODE ANN. SECTION 78-27-24(6).
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A.
Mr. and Mrs. Mori visits to Utah as a married couple do not
rise to the level of "having resided" as required by Utah's longarm statute (78-27-24(6)).
Utah's long-arm statute provides that any person who, in
person or through an agent, does any of seven enumerated acts
submits himself to the jurisdiction of the courts of Utah as to
any claim arising from those enumerated acts. (Utah Code Ann. 7827-24).

Subsection 6 of Utah's long-arm statute provides in

material part:
(6) with respect to actions of divorce, separate
maintenance, or child support, having resided, in the
marital relationship, within this state notwithstanding
subsequent departure from the state . . . .
(Emphasis added).
The district court erroneously concluded that Mr. Mori had
"resided" in Utah while in the marital relationship. (Record at
357).

The court based this conclusion on the following:
This Court finds is [it] [sic] has jurisdiction
over the Defendant under [sub]section (6) as follows:
a.
The parties were married in Utah;
b.
Defendant was a resident of Utah for all
purposes up to and beyond his marriage date;
c.
Utah was not merely a convenient place for
marriage;
d.
The terms of the divorce decree contemplate
the return to Utah;
e.
Defendant has visitation rights in Utah;
f.
Defendant's parents are residents of Utah who
have visitation rights;
g.
The Court cannot locate any case law which
puts a time limit on how long the parties must reside
within the state following marriage.

(Record at 356-357).
The above-cited seven findings do not provide a sufficient
basis for the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction over Mr.
Mori pursuant to the long-arm statute.
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Furthermore, when stated

in their proper context, several of the above-cited findings lack
foundation to support the exercise of personal jurisdiction over
a nonresident.
B.
The marriage of the parties in Utah is insufficient to
support personal jurisdiction over Mr. Morir a resident of
England.
Prior to the marriage of the parties, Mr. Mori had been
accepted into graduate school in New York.

The parties

contemplated and decided that immediately after their marriage,
they would leave Utah and establish domicile and residency in the
State of New York. (Affidavit of Gordon Wayne Mori, October 15,
1993 f 2 ) . The U.S. Supreme Court case of Kulko v. California
Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1977), is once again helpful in
determining the applicable effect, if any, of the marriage of Mr.
and Mrs. Mori in Utah.

The U.S. Supreme Court said at page 93:

Appellant [Mr. Kulko] has been in California on only
two occasion, once in 1959 for a three-day military
stopover on his way to Korea . . . and again in 1960
for a 24-hour stopover on his return from Korean
service. To hold such temporary visits to a State a
basis for the assertion in in personam
jurisdiction
over unrelated actions arising in the future would make
a mockery of the limitations on state jurisdiction
imposed by the Fourteenth Amendment . . . where two New
York domiciliaries, for reasons of convenience, marry
in the State of California and thereafter spend their
entire married life in New York, the fact of their
California marriage by itself cannot support a
California court's exercise of jurisdiction over a
spouse who remains a New York resident in an action
relating to child support.
(Underlined added; Italics original).
The Utah long-arm statute reflects the reasoning of the U.S.
Supreme Court, listing activities from which the participant
might anticipate being "haled before a court." (Kulko v.
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California Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 98 (1977)(quoting Shaffer
v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 216 (1976)).

In the present case, the

district court found that the marriage of Mr. and Mrs. Mori in
Utah was not merely a place of convenience.
It appears that the district court was straining to bring
Mr. Mori before the courts of Utah.

At the time of their

marriage, Mr. and Mrs. Mori did not intend to reside in Utah.
They spent their entire married life residing outside of the
State of Utah having lived in New York and Tokyo, Japan.

The

parties could have planned the marriage party in New York because
it was their intention to make New York, not Utah, their
domicile.

However, a wedding in New York may have been an

inconvenience to their Utah family members.

Utah was only a

convenient place to hold a wedding before moving to New York.
Subsection (6) might apply if Mr. and Mrs. Mori had resided
in Utah in the marital relationship.

The proper definition of

the term "reside" has been at issue in several Utah cases.

Many

of these case have relied on the definition of "reside" in the
voting statutes.

For example, in Allen v. Greyhound Lines, Inc.,

583 P.2d 613 (Utah 1978), the plaintiff's personal injury claim
turned on a question of residency and domicile of the plaintiff.
The court's analysis relied, in part, upon on the voting statutes
of Utah. (Id. at 615). The court in K.O. v. Denison, 748 P.2d
588 (Utah App. 1988), turned to the voting statutes of Utah for
assistance in resolving a residency issue as it pertained to an
adoption. (Id. at 591).
Utah's voting statute is helpful in defining the term
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"resides."

(See, Utah Code Ann. § 20-2-14).

This section

provides in material part:
A person 'resides' within the state if he has his
principal place of residence within the state and has a
present intention to continue residency within the
state permanently or indefinitely . . . ."
Another helpful insight into the definition of "resides" as
it applies to a divorce action is found in Haddow v. Haddow, 7 07
P.2d 669 (Utah 1985).

The Utah Supreme Court addressed the

standard for terminating alimony if "the former spouse is
residing with a person of the opposite sex." (Id. at 672
(referring to section 30-3-5(3) of the Utah Code Annotated).

The

Utah Supreme Court said at page 672:
This Court has already said that the residency
contemplate by the statute is more than temporary stay,
(cite omitted).
*

*

*

[CJommon residency means the sharing of a common
abode that both parties consider their principal
domicile for more than a temporary or brief period of
time.
(Emphasis added).
The Haddow court relied on Knuteson v. Knuteson, 619 P.2d
1387 (Utah 1980), in which the court used the dictionary to
derive a definition of "reside."

The court found that "reside"

means "[t]o dwell permanently or for a length of time; to have a
settled abode for a time." (quoting Webster's New Twentieth
Century Dictionary, 2d ed.).

The court in Knuteson went on to

specifically hold that a stay of two months and ten days did not
qualify as "residing." (Id. at 1389).
When Mr. and Mrs. Mori wed, they did not intend or
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contemplate making Utah their home.

The days they spent in Utah

just after their marriage do not qualify as "having resided in
the marital relationship."

Nor does their 10-day stay or their

visits to Utah qualify as "residing" under Utah's case law and
statutes. (See, Haddow v. Haddow, 707 P.2d 669 (Utah 1985),
Knuteson v. Knuteson, 619 P.2d 1387 (Utah 1980), Utah Code Ann. §
20-2-14) .
The district court found that it had personal jurisdiction
over Mr. Mori because the "terms of the [Tokyo, Japan] divorce
decree contemplate the return [of Mrs. Mori] to Utah." (Record at
357).

The U.S. Supreme Court has addressed this issue in

Worldwide Volkswagen v. Woodson, Hanson v. Denckla and Kulko v.
California Superior Court.

The U.S. Supreme Court summed its

opinion on this issue at page 566 of the Worldwide Volkswagen
opinion by saying:
In Hanson v. Denckla, [357 U.S. 235 (1958)], it was no
doubt foreseeable that the settlor of a Delaware trust
would subseguently move to Florida and seek to exercise
a power of appointment there; yet we held that Florida
courts could not constitutionally exercise jurisdiction
over a Delaware trustee that had no other contacts with
the forum State. In Kulko v. California Superior
Court, 436 U.S. 98 (1978), the U.S. Supreme Court
pointed out that it was foreseeable that a divorced
wife would move to California from New York, the
domicile of the marriage, and that a minor daughter
would live with the mother. However, the U.S. Supreme
Court held that California could not exercise
jurisdiction in a child support action over the former
husband who had remained in New York.
(Emphasis added).
The fact the Tokyo Family Court foresaw that Mrs. Mori would
move to Utah following the divorce ought not be viewed as Mr.
Mori's submission to specific or general personal jurisdiction.
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Mr. Mori moved directly from Japan to reside in England after the
divorce.

The U.S. Supreme Court has rejected the argument that

the foreseeability of a subsequent move by a potential plaintiff
will confer personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant.
(Idk).

C.
The locus of visitation rights are insufficient grounds on
which to basis the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a
nonresident.
The U.S. Supreme Court has denounced the exercise of
personal jurisdiction over a nonresident parent based upon the
custodial parent's residence.

In Kulko, the U.S. Supreme Court

said at pages 101:
We therefore believe that the state courts in the
instant case failed to heed our admonition that 'the
flexible standard of International
Shoe does not
'herald the eventual demise of all restrictions on the
personal jurisdiction of state courts.' (cites omitted)
[W]e commented on the extension of in
personam
jurisdiction under evolving standards of due process,
explaining that this trend was in large part
'attributable to the . . . increasing nationalization
of commerce . . . accompanied by modern transportation
and communication that have made it much less
burdensome for a party sued to defend himself in a
State where he engages in economic activity, (cite
omitted). But the mere act of sending a child to
California to live with her mother is not a commercial
act and connotes no intent to obtain or expectancy of
receiving a corresponding benefit in the State that
would make fair the assertion of that State's judicial
jurisdiction.
(Underlined added; Italics original).
The U.S. Supreme Court, in Worldwide Volkswagen, addressing
the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident
defendant said at page 297:
The nonresident's contacts must be such that he should
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"reasonably anticipate being hauled into court" in this
state*
(Emphasis added).
Mrs. Mori's residence in the State of Utah is insufficient
as a basis for the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction
over her former husband.

The U.S. Supreme Courtf in Hanson v.

Denckla at page 253, said:
The unilateral activity of those who claim some
relationship with a nonresident defendant cannot
satisfy the requirement of contact with the forum
State.
(Emphasis added).
To hold that visitation rights can serve as a basis for
specific personal jurisdiction over a nonresident would mean that
Mr. Mori would be amenable to suit wherever his former wife
happens to be residing.

Thus, the residence of the former wife,

and not the defendant purposeful contacts with the state, would
determine our court's jurisdiction.

For a state court to

exercise specific personal jurisdiction pursuant to the long-arm
statute merely because the mother is residing there may
discourage parents from entering into reasonable visitation
agreements. (See, Kulko).
The district court also based its exercise of personal
jurisdiction over Mr. Mori, a nonresident, on the fact that Mr.
Mori's parents, who are residents of Utah, have visitation rights
in Utah.

The court said, with respect to the grandparent's

visitation rights, at pages 9 and 10 of the Amended Amended
Findings of Fact and Conclusions at Law:
This Court finds is (sic) has jurisdiction over
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the Defendant under [sub]section (6) [of Utah's longarm statute] as follows:
*

*

*

f.
Defendant's parents are residents of Utah who
have visitation rights;
(Emphasis added)(Record at 356-357),
Utah's strong interest in protecting the welfare of its
resident children, standing alone, cannot support a finding of
specific personal jurisdiction.

No matter how emotional the

arguments for the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a
nonresident defendant may be, the court ought not exercise
personal jurisdiction where it simply does not exist.

The fact

that a nonresident's parents are residents of Utah cannot confer
personal jurisdiction over that nonresident.

Nor does the fact

that a nonresident's parents have visitations rights in the State
provide any basis for the exercise of general personal
jurisdiction over the nonresident.
POINT V.
PERMITTING ALTERNATIVE SERVICE OF PROCESS AND ENLARGEMENTS OF
TIME: THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT FOUNDATION TO HAVE MR. MORI, A
RESIDENT OF ENGLAND, SERVED BY ALTERNATIVE SERVICE OF PROCESS OR
TO PERMIT ENLARGEMENTS OF TIME FOR SERVICE OF PROCESS.
A.
There was insufficient foundation to permit alternative
service of process.
Rule 4(g) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides in
material part:
Where the identity of whereabouts of the person to
be served are unknown and cannot be ascertained through
reasonable diligence where service upon all of the
individual parties is impracticable under the
circumstances, or where there exists good cause to
believe that the person to be served is avoiding
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service of process, the party seeking service of
process may file a motion supported by affidavit
requesting an order allowing service by publication, by
mail, or by some other means. The supporting affidavit
shall set forth the efforts made to identify, locate or
serve the party to be served, or the circumstances
which make it impracticable to serve all of the
individual parties . . . .
Through the affidavit of Brian Harrison, counsel for the
plaintiff, foundation for alternative service was attempted.
However, the affidavit was fatally flawed.

Brian Harrison did

not have first-hand knowledge of any service attempts which were
alleged in his affidavit.

There is no indication or

certification that Brian C. Harrison was the individual making
any attempts to serve process on defendant.

Significantly, there

does not appear to be any affidavits by anyone who has attempted
to locate and serve Mr. Mori showing "efforts made to identify,
locate or serve the party to be served" as mandated by Rule 4(g)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Moreover, the record does

not show efforts made and that reasonable diligence was exercised
to serve Mr. Mori properly in England.
In Walker v. Rocky Mountain Recreation Corp., 508 P.2d 538
(Utah 1973), the court said at page 542:
[A]n affidavit must be made on personal knowledge of
the affiant, and set forth facts that would be
admissible in evidence and show that the affiant is
competent to testify to the matters stated therein.
Statements made merely on information and belief will
be disregarded. Hearsay and opinion testimony that
would not be admissible if testified to at trial may
not properly be set forth in an affidavit.
(Emphasis added).
Hustace v. Kapuni, 718 P.2d 1109 (HI App. 1986) is also
helpful.

In Hustace, the court, in discussing the requirements
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of obtaining an order to service the defendant by means other
than personal service, emphasized at page 1116 that:
Affidavits should specify the sources the affiant
consulted in his efforts to locate and effect personal
service on the defendant or defendants. The adverse
claimant should not be allowed to rely on a bald
statement that diligent inquiry was made . . •
Protection against violation of due process requires
vigilance against defective notice. Strict adherence
to statute is mandatory.
(Emphasis added).
The affidavit of Brian Harrison fails to meet this criteria
because no where does the affidavit provide or specify the
sources consulted, when they were consulted, who in fact was
consulted, or how they were consulted.

Nor does the affidavit

set forth the efforts to locate the defendant.

The affidavit

only contains bald statements. (See, Carlson v. Bos, 740 P.2d
1269 (Utah 1987)).
For example, paragraph 2 of the affidavit states that
"[d]efendant has deliberately and intentionally avoided service
of process . . . ."

This paragraph is conclusory as to the state

of mind of the defendant and is without any foundation.

The

plaintiff failed to provide any factual basis to substantiate
this claim.

Merely alleging that previous attempts have been

made cannot support the statement that the defendant has avoided
service of process.

Moreover, at the time plaintiff moved for an

enlargement of time there was no factual basis of any attempts
made nor by whom they were made, how they were made, where they
were made, and when they were made.

Both of plaintiff's motions

to enlarge time were inadequately supported.

33

In Downey State Bank v. Maior-Blakenev Corporation, 545 P.2d
507 (Utah 1976), defendant contended that the plaintiff's
affidavit was insufficient to justify an order to publish
summons.

The court said at page 509:

Concerning the sufficiency of the plaintiff's
affidavit of jurisdictional facts: We recognize that
such an affidavit is not sufficient if it state mere
conclusions as to diligent search and inquiry. It must
set forth facts upon which the court can base a
judgment as to whether such diligence has been
exercised to meet that requirement, (footnote omitted).
(Emphasis added).
There was no legal basis for plaintiff's motion because the
affidavit of plaintiff's attorney was legally insufficient and
failed to comply with Rule 4(g) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
B.
There was insufficient support for the enlargement of time
to effectuate service of process.
Plaintiff's Motion to Enlarge Time failed to meet the
standards set forth in Rule 4(g) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.

Plaintiff's Motion to Enlarge Time is based upon and

supported by the affidavit of Brian C. Harrison, attorney for
plaintiff.

Paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 of this affidavit lack

foundation and may be hearsay. (Record at 40-41).
Rule 4 of Utah Civil Procedure requires that defendant be
served with process "no later than 120 days after the filing of
the complaint.

Filing a motion to enlarge time for service of

process nearly two (2) years after the filing of the complaint
was not timely.
The case of Motsinger v. Flvnt, 119 F.R.D. 373 (M.D.N.C.
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1988) is helpful in identifying the proper use of discretion in
granting an enlargement of time for service of process.

The

court said at page 375:
If a party should wait until after the expiration of
time, then the burden is more rigorous and requires
more than inadvertence, mistake, or unfamiliarity with
the rules. Rule 6(b)(2). Rather, the party must
demonstrate his good faith, a reasonable basis for
noncompliance, and lack of prejudice to defendant in
making the untimely request for an extension. 4A C.
Wright & Miller, Federal
Practice
and Procedure,
§ 1165
(1987) . . . Motions for additional time to serve
process made prior to the expiration of 120-day period
of Rule 4(j) will be more liberally granted than those
which are made after the expiration, (cite omitted).
Motions for an extension of the service time made after
the running of the 120-day period require a
considerably greater showing of cause.
(Emphasis added).
In the present case, the district's court's extension of
time for process beyond that time contemplated by the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure was an abuse of discretion because of the
absence of any factual basis in the record to support such
extensions.
CONCLUSION
The inquiry to determine if the exercise of general
jurisdiction would be proper is to decide whether the nonresident
defendant had substantial and continuous contacts with the state.
If the court finds the activities are not substantial and
continuous then the court acting within the bounds of due process
may not exercise general personal jurisdiction.

When the facts

of this case are compared to Helicopteros Nacionales, it is quite
clear the district court did not have general personal
jurisdiction over Mr. Mori.

Accordingly, the inquiry should then
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turn to whether the nonresident defendant, Mr. Mori f had
submitted himself to specific personal jurisdiction pursuant to
the long-arm statute.
Under the long-arm statute, the question is whether
plaintiff's claim, or cause of action, arose from one of the
enumerated activities of the nonresident defendant.

The critical

question is whether plaintiff's claim, or cause of action to
recognize a Japanese divorce decree in Utah arose from the Mr.
Mori's activity of helping his former wife purchase a home for
her use and maintaining a checking account through which child
support is paid.

If the claim did not arise from the activity

described in the long-arm statute, the nonresident defendant has
not submitted himself to the specific personal jurisdiction of
the court.

"If the relevant state statute does not permit

jurisdiction, then the inquiry is ended." (Arquello v« Industrial
Woodworking Mach., 838 P.2d 1120, 1122 (Utah 1992)).
Mr. Mori did not submit himself to the jurisdiction of the
district court.

The enumerated subsections of Utah's long-arm

statute are not directly related to the cause of action, or claim
and therefore, the court lacks specific personal jurisdiction
over Mr. Mori.
Moreover, whether Mr. Mori, a resident of England, has
performed pursuant to an alleged contract made in Tokyo, Japan
ought not be the inquiry to determine whether the court has
specific personal jurisdiction under Utah's long-arm statute.
The inquiry should have been confined to whether the claim arose
from one of the enumerated acts of the long-arm statute.
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If the court should determine that there was no foundation
for service of process, ought the court entertain the
jurisdictional arguments?

Mr. Mori is a resident of England and

does not intend to return to Utah.
have Mr. Mori properly served.

Presumably, Mrs. Mori could

If she does, the same

jurisdictional facts and issues will exist and the same motions
will likely be made.

If the court concludes the district court

should not have extended the time for service of process or
granted enlargement of time after the 120-day period for service
had expired then the jurisdiction argument will be moot.

Because

this case will likely be brought again on these same facts, it is
urged upon the court to address the jurisdictional issues at this
time.

There is authority for this approach.
This case deals with individuals who left Utah as students.

Eventually, one of the parties became a resident and continues to
be a resident of a foreign country.

This type of circumstance

becomes more common place as people from our society become more
cosmopolitan.
concern."

Therefore, this becomes an issue of "wide

Moreover, the controversy in this case will continue

in another civil case if this case is dismissed upon the Rule 4
issues.
This court said in Reynolds v. Reynolds, 788 P.2d 1044 (Utah
App. 1990), at page 1045:
Because of a longstanding judicial policy in Utah to
avoid advisory opinions, we do not generally consider
mooted questions on appeal, (cites omitted).
There are, however, exceptions to this general rule.
has gone on to say:
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This court

A court may litigate an issue which, although
technically moot as to a particular litigant at the

time of appeal, is of wide concern, affects
the public
interest,
is likely to recur in a similar manner, and
because of the brief time any one person is affected,
would otherwise likely escape judicial review.
(Emphasis original) (Id. at 1046 (quoting Wickman v.
Fisher, 629 P.2d 896, 899 (Utah 1981)).
Accordingly, it is requested that the court rule on all
issues presented.
Dated this 12th day of October, 1994.

f
RENT D. YOTOG
Attorney for Defemiant/Appellant
shawn\mori.bf
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HARRIS, CARTER & HARRISON
Brian C. Harrison
Attorney for Plaintiffs
3325 North University Avenue, #200
Provo, Utah 84604
Telephone: (801) 375-9801
Utah State Bar #1388

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
TOSHIKO SASAI MORI
Plaintiff,

;
])

COMPLAINT

-vsGORDON WAYNE MORI
Defendant.

]
]>

Civil No.

_2z4&Z£Mf

COMES NOW Plaintiff by and through her attorney, Brian C
Harrison, and for cause of action alleges as follows:
1.

On the 1st day of June, 1987, Plaintiff obtained a decree

of divorce against the above-named Defendant in the Tokyo Family
Court.

A certified copy and translation thereof is attached hereto,

marked Exhibit "A", and incorporated herein by reference.

2.

This action is brought pursuant to Section 78-22(a)-2 and

other relevant statutes of the Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as
amended.
3.

The Tokyo Family Court, at and prior to the time of the

institution of that cause, was and is at this time a Court having
general jurisdiction.
4.

The foregoing decree was notarized by the Consul of the

United States of America and the translation thereof was sworn to by
Charles E. Robertson III, who was duly commissioned and qualified
to act as Consul of the United States of America.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays that the divorce decree be
registered in the above-entitled Court.
DATED this 10th day of November, 1990.

Brian C. Harrison
Attorney for Plaintiff

FiLED iH
4TH DISTRICT COURT
STATr ^ F J J T A H

JfiH 3

M 33. Pll *9I

HARRIS, CARTER & HARRISON
Brian C. Harrison
Attorney for Plaintiffs
3325 North University Avenue, #200
Provo, Utah 84604
Telephone: (801) 375-9801
Utah State Bar #1388

IN THE FOURTH JUDIQAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
TOSHJXO SASAI MORI

]
])

Plaintiff,
-vs-

AFFIDAVIT

]

GORDON WAYNE MORI,

]
]>

Defendant.

STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OFUTAH

)

Civil No.

f/sA/^t^Z'

:ss.

Brian C. Harrison, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:
1.

I am the attorney for the Plaintiff in the above-entitled

matter.
2.

On November 19, 1987, a complaint was filed in the

above-entitled Court under Civil No. CV-87-2572 which contained an

6

original certified copy of the decree of divorce and translation
thereof which was entered in the Tokyo Family Court.
3.

The above copy is the only original existing and should be

attached to the new complaint on file herein.
4.

Defendant has deliberately and intentionally avoided

service of process in the previous complaint, service having been
attempted in Tokyo, Japan and Los Angeles, California.
5.

Defendant now resides in London, England, and service

upon said Defendant would best be accomplished as provided under
Rule 4(f)(3) requiring the Defendant to be served by registered mail
dispatched by the Clerk of the Court.
6.

Further affiant saith naught.

DATED this 1% day of November, 1990.

Brian C. Harrison
Attorney for Plaintiff

STATE OF UTAH

)
:ss.

COUNTY OF UTAH

)

SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this
^Wt^Ju^
1990.

NOTARY

^

day of

CAMILLE8ROW&,
HevwpvEUC'SmzcturAH \
216 NORTH 200 EAST #3
SPRiNGVlLLE,UT 84663

'. mEXRJUN-5-34

!
j

HILL, HARRISON, HILL & FISHER
Brian C. Harrison
Attorney for Plaintiff
3319 North University Avenue, #200
Provo, Utah 84604
Telephone: (801) 375-6600
Utah State Bar #1388

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
TOSHIKO SASAI MORI,
Plaintiff,

AFFIDAVIT

-vsGORDON WAYNE MORI,
Defendant.

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF UTAH

I

Civil No. 914400048

)
:ss
)

Brian C. Harrison, being first duly sworn, deposes and
says:
1.

The Complaint in this matter was filed on or about

November 10, 1990, seeking to register a foreign divorce
decree which was rendered in the Tokyo Family Court on June 1,

1987.
2.

Defendant has deliberately and intentionally avoided

service of process, service having been previously attempted
in Tokyo, Japan, Los Angeles, California, and London, England.
3.

On January 9, 1991, by order of the above entitled

Court, Plaintiff was

granted to

serve the

Defendant by

registered mail.
4.

Between January 17, 1991, and approximately April 1,

1992, attempts were made to serve the Defendant by registered
mail but said service was unsuccessful.
5.

Plaintiff has sought the assistance of the United

States Department of State relative to personal service on the
Defendant and has been provided the appropriate forms and
documents to effect service through the Department of State in
London, England.
6.

It is anticipated that service of process on the

Defendant can be effected within the next ninety (90) days.
Further affiant saith naught.
DATED this

/7 day of Mo^cmbor, 1992.

f^ - /Brian C. Harrison
Attorney for Plaintiff

NOTARY PUBLIC
SUBSCRIBED

and

Qtfi/JrtM^

sworn

to

before

me

this

/7

day

,1992.

x j - ^
SYLV5A A. BUNDRAffT
' " " ^ ^L aW NowrpuauC'Stffittum

3319 NORTH UNI V.AVE. #200
NIELSONHtLL & FISHER
PflCVO, UTAH 84604

COMM. EXP. 1-20-96

XJMJ. $/j?j<t44jrS$>^L——,.—-.
NOTARY P<tJBLIC

of

STATE Or:b^H

HILL, HARRISON, HILL & FISHER
Brian C. Harrison
Attorney for Plaintiff
3319 North University Avenue, #200
Provo, Utah 84604
Telephone: (801) 375-6600
Utah State Bar #1388

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
TOSHIKO SASAI MORI,
Plaintiff,

)i

i

AFFIDAVIT OF
BRIAN C. HARRISON

i

Civil No. 914400048

-vsGORDON WAYNE MORI,
Defendant.
STATE OF UTAH

)
:ss
COUNTY OF UTAH )
Brian C. Harrisonf being first duly sworn, deposes and
says:
1.

The Complaint in this matter was filed on or about

November 10, 1990, seeking to register a foreign divorce
decree which was rendered in the Tokyo Family Court on June 1,
1987.
2•

Defendant has deliberately and intentionally avoided

service of process, service having been previously attempted

in Tokyo, Japan, Los Angeles, California, and London, England.
3.

On January 9, 1991, by order of the above-entitled

Court, Plaintiff was granted permission to serve the Defendant
by registered mail.
4.

Between January 17, 1991, and approximately April 1,

1992, attempts were made to serve Defendant by registered
mail, but said service was unsuccessful due to Defendant's
refusal to accept the registered mail.
5.

Plaintiff has sought the assistance of the United

States Department of State relative to personal service on
Defendant and was provided the appropriate forms and documents
to effect service through the Department of State in London,
England.
6.

In March 1993, the Lord Chancellor's Department of

Her Majesty's Service attempted service on the Defendant at
his place of business, but Defendant refused to meet with said
bailiff.
7.

It is anticipated that service of process on the

Defendant can be effected within the next ninety (90) days.
FURTHER AFFIANT SAITH NOT.
DATED this

1 (

day of April, 1993.

£

Brian C. Harrisfen
Attorney for Plaintiff

SUBSCRIBED and sworn
April, 1993.

TRAGI C. GOODMAN

" ; y * r * N & S)0asyPB3L,S-SaTE^aH«
\ i \ ^ $ A j 812 EAST 1550 SOUTH
$ W t f
CRE.M. UTAH 8*053

^

t o before

me t h i s

A_/

day of

Irotary P u b l i c

COffli EXR M3-S7 j

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I personally mailed a true and
correct

J2&

%U

copy
fl

of the foregoing
,

1993, by

on this

first-class

/^/

U.S. mail,

prepaid, to the following:
Gordon Mori
Ropemaker Place
25 Ropemaker St.
London, E.C. 2Y9LY

^'t^C^^f^f^
>ecretary

day of
postage

FILED IN
4TH DISTRICT COURT
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HILL, HARRISON, HILL & FISHER
Brian C. Harrison
Attorney for Plaintiff
3319 North University Avenue, #200
Provo, Utah 84604
Telephone: (801) 375-6600
Utah State Bar #1388

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
TOSHIKO SASAI MORI,
Plaintiff,

ORDER

-vsGORDON WAYNE MORI,
Civil No. 914400048

Defendant.
The

Court

having

read

the Motion

to

Enlarge

Time

submitted by the Plaintiff herein, and having reviewed the
file, and being fully advised in the premises now makes the
following ruling:
1.

Plaintiff's Motion to Enlarge Time to ninety (90)

days from today's date is granted, and Plaintiff is directed
to serve Defendant with a copy of the Summons and Complaint on
file herein within said period•
2.

Plaintiff is given authority pursuant to Rule 4(g)

to effect service upon Defendant by serving copies of the

Summons and Complaint upon the Defendant personally, his
secretary, his receptionist, or his wife, and to file a Return
of Service with this Court evidencing the same.

DATED this ^ > day of /iZ^JL^

1993.

Jud^e Boyd L7 Park
District Court Judge

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I personally mailed a true and
correct

copy

of

(/^/J. \SJK

the
1993,

foregoing
by

on

this

first-class

A_j

day

of

U.S. mail, postage

prepaid, to the following:
Gordon Mori
Ropemaker Place
25 Ropemaker St.
London, E.C. 2Y9LY

Jretary

J

FILED IN
4TH DISTRICT COURT

STATE OF UTAH
UTAH COUNTY

k
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
TOSHDCO SASAI MORI,
Plaintiff,
MEMORANDUM DECISION
vs.
Case No. 914400048
GORDON WAYNE MORI,
Defendants.

Judge: Boyd L. Park

This matter is before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Strike Plaintiffs
Counsers Affidavits and Defendant's Motion to Quash Service of Process. The Court,
having heard oral arguments and, having received and reviewed the complaint, motion to
enlarge time, motion to challenge the jurisdiction of the court and to quash service of
summons, response, motion to strike plaintiffs counsel's affidavits, and supplementary
affidavit, and having heard oral arguments, makes the following findings and conclusions.
1.

The parties were divorced by order of the Tokyo Family Court on June

2.

A Complaint seeking to register the foreign decree was filed in the

1, 1987.
Fourth District Court on November 18, 1987.
3.

Defendant filed Motion to Dismiss on August 6, 1990.

4.

An Order of Dismissal was granted without prejudice on September 7,

5.

A new Complaint was filed on January 9, 1991, Civil No. 914400048.

6.

An Order allowing service by registered mail was entered on January

7.

Proof of mailing by the District Court Clerk and a receipt for registered

1990.

9, 1991.
mail was dated January 17, 1991.

8.

An inquiry regarding a registered article is dated April 1, 1991.

9.

The Court filed an Order to Show Cause on July 11, 1991.

10.

The Court granted an Order of Dismissal on August 16, 1991

11.

The Court granted an Order to Set Aside the Order of Dismissal on

October 24, 1991.
12.

Plaintiffs Counsel filed a Motion to Enlarge Time on December 18,

13.

The Court granted the Motion to Enlarge Time on January 27, 1993.

1992.

The Court allowed the time to be enlarged to April 1, 1993
14.

The Court granted a second Motion to Enlarge Time on April 22,

1993. The Court allowed the time to be enlarged to July 22, 1993. The Court also allowed
the Plaintiff to serve process upon the Defendant personally, his secretary, his receptionist,
or his wife pursuant to Rule 4 (g) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
15.

The Defendant's Counsel argues that the lapse of time between the

initial filing date of January 9, 1991 until date of service on April 30, 1993, in London,
England violates Rule 4 (b) and 4 (g) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The
Defendant's Counsel further claims that due to the violation of these rules, the Court has lost
jurisdiction.
16.

Rule 4(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states in pertinent part

"[t]he summons together with a copy of the complaint shall be served no later
that 120 days after the filing of the complaint unless the court allows a longer
period of time for good cause shown. If the summons and complaint are not
timely served, the action shall be dismissed, without prejudice on application
of any party or upon the court's own initiative." (emphasis added)
As per Rule 4 (b) above, the action is set aside only on application by any party or the
court's own initiative. The Court's Order to Set Aside Order of Dismissal was on October

2

24, 1991 and the Motion to Enlarge Time was filed on December 18, 1992. During this
period of time, none of the parties moved for dismissal and the Court did not dismiss on its
own initiative.
17.

On June 21, 1993, Defendant's Counsel filed a Motion to Strike

Plaintiffs Counsel's Affidavits. The Defendant's Counsel asserts that the Plaintiffs
Counsel's Affidavit should be stricken because the statements are conclusory, not based on
first-hand knowledge and as a result are tantamount to hearsay. Rule 4 (i) of the Utah Rule
of Civil Procedure explains the Manner of proof of service of process and how that manner
of proof is amended. Rule 4 (i) states :
"At any time in its discretion and upon such terms as it deems just, the court
may allow any process or proof of service thereof to be amended, unless it
clearly appears that material prejudice would result to the substantial rights of
the party against whom the process issued."
Rule 4 (g) of the Utah Rule of Civil Procedure explains that in dealing with supporting
affidavits for other service,:
H

[T]he supporting affidavit shall set forth the efforts made to identify, locate or

serve the party to be served, or the circumstances which make it
impracticable to serve all of the individual parties."
The Supplementary Affidavit of Brian C. Harrison filed on July 1, 1993 fulfills the
requirements of Rule 4 (g) by setting forth the efforts made to identify, locate or serve the
Defendant.
18.

The Court in its discretion and upon such terms as it deems appropriate

and just accepts the service of process and the accompanying affidavit of the Plaintiffs
Counsel as sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Rule 4 of the Utah Rule of Civil
Procedure.
19.

The Court hereby denies the Defendant's Motion to Strike the
3

422

Plaintiffs Counsel's Affidavit and denies the Defendant's Challenge to the Court's
Jurisdiction to hear this case.
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
TOSHIKO SASAI MORI

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Plaintiff,
CASE NO. 914400048

vs.

DATE: February 16, 1994
BOYD L. PARK, JUDGE

GORDON WAYNE MORI

CLERK: LHH

Defendants.

This matter came before the court on the special appearance of Mr. Brent Young, Esq.
appearing for the defendant and challenging the jurisdiction of the court. The special
appearance of attorney Young is not construed in any fashion as giving this court
jurisdiction. Mr. Brian Harrison, Esq. appeared for the plaintiff. The court having read the
memorandums of the parties in support of and in opposition to defendant's contention that
this court does not have jurisdiction, and having heard oral arguments on February 11, 1994
and being fully advised in the premises makes the following findings and conclusions:
L

The court adopts paragraphs 1-14 and paragraph 18 of its Memorandum Decision dated

August 5, 1993 for a historical overview of the case.
2.

The Defendant, Gordon Wayne Mori, was born April 19, 1959 in Sandy, Salt Lake

County, State of Utah. The Defendant lived in and maintained his residence in the state of
Utah for all purposes until May 3, 1983. (See the uncontroverted Affidavit of Toshiko Sasai
Mori and Application For License To Marry.)
3.

Plaintiff and Defendant were married April 23, 1983 in West Jordan, Utah. (See

Affidavit of Toshiko Sasai Mori and Application For License To Marry.)
4.

The court finds the Defendant was an actual and bona fide resident of the state of Utah

for all purposes from date of birth o May 3, 1985.
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5.

Plaintiff and Defendant left the state of Utah May 3, 1985 to attend graduate school at

Columbia University in New York City, New York. (See Affidavits of Toshiko Sasai Mori
and Gordon Wayne Mori.)
6.

During the year of 1985 the Plaintiff returned to Sandy, Utah to live with Defendant's

parents for a period of three weeks. The Defendant also returned to Sandy, Utah and spent 3
days of the said 3 weeks with the Plaintiff and Defendant's parents. The parties then left for
employment in Tokyo, Japan. (See Affidavit of Toshiko Sasai Mori and Gordon Wayne
Mori.)
7.

A child named Bryan was born to the parties on July 31, 1986 in Japan. (See Affidavit

of Toshiko Sasai Mori.)
8.

In October of 1986 Defendant asked Plaintiff for a divorce. The Plaintiff refused. (See

Affidavit of Toshiko Sasai Mori.)
9.

In January of 1987 Defendant returned to the state of Utah to purchase a home in

Provo, Utah.

(See Affidavit of Toshiko Sasai Mori.)

10. In March of 1987 Plaintiff and Defendant entered into an Earnest Money Agreement to
purchase a home in Orem, Utah.
11.

(See Affidavit of Toshiko Sasai Mori.)

On March 30, 1987 and again on June 1, 1987 the Defendant executed powers of

attorney authorizing his father to act in his behalf for all purposes regarding the purchase of
a home and the execution of all documents concerning the purchase of a home in Orem,
Utah. (See Exhibits A &B attached to the Affidavit of Toshiko Sasai Mori.)
12.

On June 25, 1987 the Plaintiff and Defendant (through his father as defendant's

attorney in fact) and defendant's parents, Nobuo Mori and Kazuko Mori purchased a home
for the use and benefit of the Plaintiff and child Bryan in Orem, Utah and executed a Deed
of Trust and Note. (See Exhibits C & D attached to Affidavit of Toshiko Sasai Mori.)
13. The Divorce Decree from Japan, entitled AWARD (Binding) which is translated into
English and is attached to the Plaintiffs Complaint, contains the following provisions:

Case No. 914400048 Mod v. Mod
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a.

Dissolved the marriage,

b.

Granted custody of the child to Plaintiff (referred to in divorce decree as
Respondent),

c.

Required Petitioner (Defendant) to pay Respondent (Plaintiff) $30,000. $20,000
at once, receipt of which is acknowledged by the Plaintiff. Plaintiff alleges the
$10,000 to be paid by January 31, 1989 has not been paid.

d.

Required Petitioner (Defendant) to provide a house in Orem, Utah for the
Respondent (Plaintiff) and title the property in the name of the Respondent
(Plaintiff) within five (5) years at the sole cost of the Petitioner (Defendant).

e.

Required Petitioner (Defendant) to pay to Respondent (Plaintiff) the sum of $800
per month child support from June 1987 up to and including the child's twentieth
(20) birthday, with the further provision that child support shall be reconsidered in
accordance with changes in circumstances. Plaintiff alleges the Defendant has
unilaterally reduced the child support to $400 per month even though Defendant
has had a substantial increase of income.

f.
.

(Plaintiff) agreed to allow Petitioner's (Defendant's) parents to visit the child one

jfi?
^W*

Petitioner (Defendant) was given the right to visit the child and Respondent
weekend per month.

S^%

^^Qn^2Lnt maintains a bank account with his father at Zions First National Bank, Salt
Lake City, Utah. (See attached photocopy of check no. 554 dated Decgmber-27, 1993.)
15. Defendant contends the state of Utah should not recognize a divorce decree from Japan,

and that this court should not rely on the doctrine of comity as the Defendant refuses to
submit himself to the personal jurisdiction of this court. Should this court find and conclude
it has personal jurisdiction over the Defendant, then Defendant's argument is without merit.

Case No. 914400048 Mod v. Mod

16. Defendant next alleges this court is without jurisdiction as Utah's long-arm statute, §7827-24 Utah Code Annotated is not applicable to the Defendant. The court will now consider
the provisions of §78-27-24 Utah Code Annotated as it may apply to the Defendant.
78-27-24 "Any person, not withstanding Section 16-10a-1501, whether or
not a citizen or resident of this state, who in person or through an agent does any
of the following enumerated acts, submits himself, and if an individual, his
personal representative, to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state as to any
claim arising from:"
"(1) the transaction of any business within this state;"
It is clear the Defendant has transacted business in the state of Utah subsequent to the
marriage of the parties. The Defendant either personally or through an agent contracted to
purchase a home in Orem, Utah. The Defendant personally or through his agent makes the
monthly payments on the home in Utah. The Defendant sends monthly child support
payments to the Plaintiff by way of checks drawn on Zions Bank of Salt Lake City, Utah.
The Plaintiff and the child of the parties live in the home purchased by the parties during the
course of their marriage. The Japan Divorce Decree contemplates the Plaintiff and the child
of the parties would live in the state of Utah. The Supreme Court of this state has addressed
general personal jurisdiction and specific personal jurisdiction in Arguello v. Industrial
Woodworking Machine Co.. 838 P.2d 1120 (Utah 1992) at page 1122.
"General personal jurisdiction permits a court to exercise power over a
defendant without regard to the subject of the claim asserted. For such
jurisdiction to exist, the defendant must be conducting substantial and continuous
local activity in the forum state. In contrast, specific personal jurisdiction gives a
court power over a defendant only with respect to claims arising out of the
particular activities of the defendant in the forum state/
The courtmnds^me Defendant is conducting substantial and continuous local activity in
foe sta^e of Utah. Even if the court could not find general personal jurisdiction the court
could find specific personal jurisdiction on the claim of the Plaintiff as it relates to the
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ownership of the Orem home as this arises out of a particular activity of the Defendant in the
state of Utah. The divorce decree at paragraph no. 3 provides the Defendant will change the
name of the tide holder to the Plaintiff within five years at the sole cost of the Defendant.
The Defendant has failed to do so and the five year period was up on June 1, 1992. Further,
in the exercise of due process the maintenance of the suit in the state of Utah does not offend
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. See Arguello at page 1123. There is
no other forum in this world where fair play and substantial justice would be better served
considering the circumstances of the parties.
"(2) Contracting to supply services or goods to this state;"
"(3) The causing of any injury within this state whether tortious or by breach of
warranty-/
Plaintiff has made out a fair case at the time of oral argument concerning these two
sections and how this court would have jurisdiction. The court will not address these two
sections as the court feels the stronger position is with sections (1), (4) and (6).
"(4) The ownership, use, or possession of any real estate situated in this state;"
There is no doubt the Defendant has an ownership interest in real estate in Orem, Utah
as hereinbefore addressed. There appears to be no limiting language regarding this provision
of the statute, and since part of Plaintiffs claim has to do with the ownership of the real
estate, the court finds it has general personal jurisdiction over the defendant.
"(6) With respect to actions of divorce, separate maintenance, or child support,
having resided in the marital relationship, within this state notwithstanding subsequent
departure from the state.
The Defendant was born and raised in the state of Utah and was a resident for all
purposes up to the time of his marriage to the Plaintiff. The parties were married in Utah
and left the state ten days later for Defendant's post graduate study in New York City at
Columbia University.
This court finds it has jurisdiction over the defendant under section 6 as follows:
Case No. 914400048 Mod v. Mod

5

a.

The parties were married in Utah;

b.

Defendant was a resident of Utah for all purposes up to and beyond his marriage
date;

c.

Utah was not merely a convenient place for marriage;

d.

The terms of the divorce decree contemplate the return to Utah;

e.

Defendant has visitation rights in Utah;

f.

Defendant's parents are residents of Utah who have visitation rights;

g.

The court cannot locate any case law which puts a time limit on how long the
parties must reside within the state following marriage.

17. The court further finds that the state of Utah is the only forum where it is fair and
reasonable for the Plaintiff and Defendant to litigate the divorce decree as due process would
be best served in the state of Utah. The Defendant is a resident of England, however the
divorce was acquired in Japan. Neither party has any connection to Japan at this time.
England does not have subject jurisdiction regarding the divorce and only limited personal
jurisdiction. Neither party has any residential relationship to any other state and neither
party has any significant connection with any other state. Should the court find that Utah
Was not the proper forum for the litigation and that Utah had no jurisdiction over the
Defendant, then Plaintiff would be without a remedy. Due process could never be served if
Plaintiff was without a remedy.
18. Defendant contends that the case of Kulko v. California Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 is
factually similar to this case and should be controlling. The court does not find the facts
sufficiently similar to this case, and draws a distinction between the two cases. In doing so,
the court does not find a disagreement with the majority decision in the Kulko case.
19. Defendant's challenge of the court's jurisdiction is denied*

Case No. 914400048 Mori v. Mori
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20. Counsel for Plaintiff is to prepare findings of fact and conclusions of law and order
consistent with the above and present the same to counsel for Defendant for approval as to
form prior to presentment to the court for signature.
21. Defendant shall have 30 days to respond to Plaintiffs Complaint, plus an additional ten
days for mailing of this court's order to the Defendant following the court's signing of the
findings of fact and conclusions of law and order.
Dated this 16th day of February, 1994.
BY THE COURT:

cc: Brian Harrison, Esq.
Brent Young, Esq.

coo^j
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HILL, HARRISON & HILL
Brian C. Harrison
Attorney for Plaintiff
3319 North University Avenue, #200
Provo, Utah 84604
Telephone: (801) 375-6600
Utah State Bar #1388

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
TOSHIKO SASAI MORI,
Plaintiff,

i

ORDER

i

Civil No. 914400048

-vsGORDON WAYNE MORI,
Defendant.

This matter having come on regularly before the Court on
February

11, 1994, Plaintiff appearing in person and by her

attorney, Brian C. Harrison, and the Defendant being represented by
his attorney Brent Young, and the Court having considered the
challenge of Mr, Young to the jurisdiction of the Court, and the
special appearance of Mr. Young not being construed in any fashion
as giving this Court jurisdiction, and the Court having read the
memorandums of the parties and having heard oral arguments, and
being fully advised in the premises, and having heretofore entered
its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AS FOLLOWS:

1.

Defendant's challenge to the Court's jurisdiction is

denied.
2.

Defendant is granted 30 days to respond to Plaintiff's

Complaint plus an additional 10 days for mailing of this Court's
Order to the Defendant

following the Court's signing of the

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order.
DATED this

/%

day of /AJ2^CA,

1994.

;'

toy&A*. Park

District Court Judge
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I personally mailed a true and correct
copy of the foregoing on this

>^2f/day of March, 1994, by first-

-class U.S. mail, postage prepaid, to the following:
Brent Young
48 N. University Ave.
P.O. Box 672
Provo, UT 84603
_^&L<?^

Secretary

^3d
£~ w/ ^t
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HILL, HARRISON & HILL
Brian C. Harrison
Attorney for Plaintiff
3319 North University Avenue, #200
Provo, Utah 84604
Telephone: (801) 375-6600
Utah State Bar #1388

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
TOSHIKO SASAI MORI,
Plaintiff,

|
]|
|

AMENDED
AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

-vsGORDON WAYNE MORI,
Defendant.

i

Civil No. 914400048

This matter having come on regularly before the Court on
February

11, 1994, Plaintiff appearing in person and by her

attorney, Brian C. Harrison, and the Defendant being represented by
his attorney Brent Young, and the Court having considered the
challenge of Mr. Young to the jurisdiction of the Court, and the
special appearance of Mr. Young not being construed in any fashion
as giving this Court jurisdiction, and the Court having read the
memorandums of the parties and having heard oral arguments, and
being fully advised in the premises, hereby enters its:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The parties were divorced by order of the Tokyo Family
00

Court on June 1, 1987,
2.

A Complaint seeking to register the foreign decree was

filed in the Fourth District Court on November 18, 1987.
3.

Defendant filed Motion to Dismiss on August 6, 1990.

4.

An Order of Dismissal was granted without prejudice on

September 7, 1990.
5.

A new Complaint was filed on January 9, 1991, Civil No.

914400048.
6.

An Order allowing service by registered mail was entered

on January 9, 1991.
7.

Proof of mailing by the District Court Clerk and a

receipt for registered mail was dated January 17, 1991.
8.

An inquiry regarding a registered article is dated April

1, 1991.
9.

The Court filed an Order to Show Cause on July 11, 1991.

10.

The Court granted an Order of Dismissal on August 16,

11.

The Court granted an Order to Set Aside the Order of

1991.

Dismissal on October 24, 1991.
12.

Plaintiff's Counsel filed a Motion to Enlarge Time on

December 18, 1992.
13.

The Court granted the Motion to Enlarge Time on January

27, 1993.
2
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14.

The Court granted a second Motion to Enlarge Time on

April 22, 1993. The Court allowed the time to be enlarged to July
22, 1993.

The Court also allowed the Plaintiff to serve process

upon the Defendant personally, his secretary, his receptionist, or
his wife pursuant to Rule 4(g) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
15.

The Court in its discretion and upon such terms as it

deems appropriate and just accepts the service of process and the
affidavit of the Plaintiff's Counsel as sufficient to satisfy the
requirements of Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
16.

The Defendant, Gordon Wayne Mori, was born April 19,

1959, in Sandy, Salt Lake County, State of Utah.

The Defendant

lived in and maintained his residence in the state of Utah for all
purposes until May 3, 1983.

(See the uncontroverted Affidavit of

Toshiko Sasai Mori, dated November 5, 1993, and marked Exhibit "A"
and the Application for License to Marry, dated April 15, 1983, and
marked Exhibit "B".)
17.

Plaintiff and Defendant were married April 23, 1983, in

West Jordan, Utah.
18.

(See attached Exhibit "A" and Exhibit "B".)

The Court finds the Defendant was an actual and bona fide

resident of the state of Utah for all purposes from date of birth
to May 3, 1983.
19.

Plaintiff and Defendant left the state of Utah May 3,
3
\J

1983, to attend graduate school at Columbia University in New York
City, New York.

(See attached Exhibit "A" and Affidavit of Gordon

Wayne Mori, dated October 15, 1993, and marked Exhibit "C".)
20.

During the year of 1985 the Plaintiff returned to Sandy,

Utah, to live with Defendant's parents for a period of three (3)
weeks. The Defendant also returned to Sandy, Utah, and spent three
(3) days of the

said three

Defendant's parents.
Tokyo, Japan.
21.

The parties then left for employment

(See attached Exhibit "A".)

In October 1986, Defendant asked Plaintiff for a divorce.
(See attached Exhibit "A".)

In January 1987, Defendant returned to the state of Utah

to purchase a home in Provo, Utah.
24.

in

A child named Bryan was born to the parties on July 31,

The Plaintiff refused.
23.

and

(See attached Exhibit "A" and Exhibit "C".)

1986, in Japan.
22.

(3) weeks with the Plaintiff

(See attached Exhibit "A".)

In March 1987, Plaintiff and Defendant entered into an

Earnest Money Agreement to purchase a home in Orem, Utah.

(See

attached Exhibit "A".)
25.

On

March

30, 1987, and

again

on June

1, 1987, the

Defendant executed powers of attorney authorizing his father to act
in his behalf for all purposes regarding the purchase of a home and
the execution of all documents concerning the purchase of a home in
Orem, Utah.

(See Exhibits "A" & "B" attached to the Affidavit of
4

Toshiko Sasai Mori, Exhibit "A" herein.)
26.
his

On June 25, 1987, the Plaintiff and Defendant (through

father

as

Defendant's

attorney

in

fact)

and

Defendant's

parents, Nobuo Mori and Kazuko Mori, purchased a home for the use
and benefit of the Plaintiff and child Bryan in Orem, Utah, and
executed

a Deed

of Trust and Note.

attached

to the Affidavit

of Toshiko

(See Exhibits

"C" & "D"

Sasai Mori, Exhibit

"A"

herein.)
27.

The Divorce Decree from Japan, entitled AWARD (Binding)

which is translated into English and is attached to the Plaintiff's
Complaint, contains the following provisions:
a.

Dissolved the marriage;

b.

Granted custody of the child to Plaintiff (referred

to in divorce decree as Respondent);
c.

Required Petitioner (Defendant) to pay Respondent

(Plaintiff) $30,000.

$20,000 at once, receipt of which is

acknowledged by the Plaintiff.

Plaintiff alleges the $10,000

to be paid by January 31, 1989, has not been paid;
d.

Required Petitioner (Defendant) to provide a house

in Orem, Utah, for the Respondent (Plaintiff) and title the
property in the name of the Respondent (Plaintiff) within five
(5) years at the sole cost of the Petitioner (Defendant);
e.

Required Petitioner (Defendant) to pay to Respondent
5

(Plaintiff) the sum of $800 per month child support from June
1987, up to and including the child's twentieth (20) birthday,
with the

further provision that

child

support

shall be

reconsidered in accordance with changes in circumstances.
Plaintiff alleges the Defendant has unilaterally reduced the
child support to $400 per month even though Defendant has had
a substantial increase of income;
£.
the

Petitioner (Defendant) was given the right to visit

child

and

Respondent

(Plaintiff)

agreed

to

allow

Petitioner's (Defendant's) parents to visit the child one
weekend per month.
28.

Defendant maintains a bank account with his father at

Zions First National Bank, Salt Lake City, Utah.

(See attached

Exhibit "D".)
29.

Defendant contends the state of Utah should not recognize

a divorce decree form Japan, and that this court should not rely on
the doctrine of comity as the Defendant refused to submit himself
to personal jurisdiction of this Court. Should this Court find and
conclude it has personal jurisdiction over the Defendant, then
Defendant's argument is without merit.
30.

Defendant next alleges this Court is without jurisdiction

as Utah's long-arm statute, Section 78-27-24 Utah Code Annotated is
not applicable to the Defendant.
6

The Court will now consider

provisions of Section 78-27-24 Utah Code Annotated as it may apply
to the Defendant.
78-27-24 "Any person, not withstanding
Section 16-10a-1501, whether or not ea citizen
or resident of this state, who in person or
through an agent does any of the following
enumerated acts, submits himself, and if an
individual, his personal representative, to
the jurisdiction of the courts of this state
as to any claim arising from:"
"(1) the transaction of any business within this
state;"
It is clear the Defendant has transacted business in the state
of Utah subsequent to the marriage of the parties.

The Defendant

either personally or through an agent contracted to purchase a home
in Orem, Utah. The Defendant personally or through his agent makes
the monthly payments on the home in Utah.

The Defendant sends

monthly child support payments to the Plaintiff by way of checks
drawn on Zions Bank of Salt Lake City, Utah. The Plaintiff and the
child of the parties live in the home purchased by the parties
during the course of their marriage.

The Japan Divorce Decree

contemplates the Plaintiff and the child of the parties would live
in the state of Utah.

The Supreme Court of this state has

addressed general personal jurisdiction and specific personal
jurisdiction in Arauello v. Industrial Woodworking Machine Co., 838
P.2d 1120 (Utah 1992) at page 1122.
"General personal jurisdiction permits a court to
exercise power over a Defendant without regard to the
7

subject of the claim asserted. For such jurisdiction to
exist, the Defendant must be conducting substantial and
continuous local activity in the forum state.
In
contrast, specific
personal jurisdiction gives a court
power over a Defendant only with respect to claims
arising out of the particular activities of the Defendant
in the forum state."
The Court finds the Defendant is conducting substantial and
continuous activity in the state of Utah. Even if the Court could
not

find general personal

jurisdiction

the Court could find

specific personal jurisdiction on the claim of the Plaintiff as it
relates to the ownership of the Orem home as this arises out of a
particular activity of the Defendant in the state of Utah.

The

divorce decree at paragraph no. 3 provides the Defendant will
change the name of the title holder to the Plaintiff within five
(5) years at the sole cost of the Defendant.

The Defendant has

failed to do so and the five (5) year period was up on June 1,
1992.

Further, in the exercise of due process the maintenance of

the suit in the state of Utah does not offend traditional notions
See Arguello

at page 1123.

forum in this world where

fair play and

of fair play and substantial justice.
There is no other
substantial

justice

would

be

better

served

considering

the

circumstances of the parties.
"(2) Contracting to supply services or goods to this
state;"
"(3) The causing of any injury within this state whether
tortious or by breach of warranty;"
8

Plaintiff has made out a fair case at the time of oral
argument concerning these two (2) sections and how this Court would
have jurisdiction.

The Court will not address these two (2)

sections as the Court feels the stronger position is with sections
(1), (4), and (6).
"(4) The ownership, use, or possession of any real estate
situated in this state;"
There is no doubt the Defendant has an ownership interest in
real estate in Orem, Utah, as hereinbefore addressed.

There

appears to be no limiting language regarding this provision of the
statute, and since part of Plaintiff's claim has to do with the
ownership of the real estate, the Court finds is has general
personal jurisdiction over the Defendant.
"(6) With respect to actions of divorce, separate
maintenance, or child support, having resided in the
marital relationship, within this state notwithstanding
subsequent departure from the state..."
The Defendant was born and raised in the state of Utah and was
a resident for all purposes up to the time of his marriage to the
Plaintiff. The parties were married in Utah and left the state ten
(10) days later for Defendant's post graduate study in New York
City at Columbia University.
This Court finds is has jurisdiction over the Defendant under
section (6) as follows:
a.

The parties were married in Utah;
9
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b.

Defendant was a resident of Utah for all purposes up

to and beyond his marriage date;
c.

Utah was not merely a convenient place for marriage;

d.

The terms of the divorce decree contemplate the

return to Utah;
e.

Defendant has visitation rights in Utah;

f.

Defendant's parents are residents of Utah who have

visitation rights;
g.

The Court cannot locate any case law which puts a

time limit on how long the parties must reside within the
state following marriage.
31.

The Court further finds that the state of Utah is the

only forum where it is fair and reasonable for the Plaintiff and
Defendant to litigate the divorce decree as due process would be
best served in the state of Utah.

The Defendant is a resident of

England, however, the divorce was acquired in Japan. Neither party
has any connection to Japan at this time.
subject
personal

jurisdiction

regarding

jurisdiction.

relationship

to

any

the

Neither

other

state

England does not have

divorce

party
and

and

has

neither

any

only

limited

residential

party

has

any

significant connection with any other state. Should the Court find
that Utah was not the proper forum for the litigation and that Utah
had no jurisdiction over the Defendant, then Plaintiff would be
10

without a remedy.

Due process could never be served if Plaintiff

was without a remedy.
32.

Defendant contends that the case of Kulko v. California

Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 is factually similar to this case and
should

be controlling.

The Court

does not

find the

facts

sufficiently similar to this case, and draws a distinction between
the two cases. In doing so, the Court does not find a disagreement
with the majority decision in the Kulko case.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact the Court now enters its:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Defendant's challenge to the Court's jurisdiction is

denied.
2.

Defendant is granted 30 days to respond to Plaintiff's

Complaint plus an additional 10 days for mailing of this Court's
Order to the Defendant

following the Court's signing of the

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order.
DATED this

/Q

day of /"/^z^K^

1994.

Joyd L. Park
District Court Judge

/

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I personally mailed a true and correct
11

copy of the foregoing on this //y*\-

day of April, 1994, by first-

-lass U.S. mail, postage prepaid, to the following:
Brent Young
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This action was properly dismissed be^
cause it should not have been started in the
first place.

fo
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ABBOTT G. M. DIESEL, INC., a
Delaware Corporation, Plaintiff
and Appellant,
v.
PIPER AIRCRAFT CORPORATION, a
Corporation, and Piper Corporate Aircraft Center-West, a corporation, aka
Corpac-West, Defendant and Respondent.
No. 15016.
Supreme Court of Utah.
April 14, 1978.
Airplane buyer sued Pennsylvania
manufacturer of airplane and others to recover damages for breach of contract,
breach of warranty and mutual mistake.
The defendant manufacturer's motion to
quash service of summons upon it and to
dismiss action for lack of personal jurisdiction was granted by an order of the Third
District Court, Salt Lake County, Marcellus
K. Snow, J., and the buyer appealed. The
Supreme Court, Wilkins, J., held that: (1)
jurisdictional standards should not be more
restrictive than those allowed by federal
due process limitations, and (2) review of
conflict in affidavits showed that case must
be remanded for hearing for resolution of
conflicts and findings of fact.
Reversed.
1. Courts *» 12(2)
State's jurisdictional standards under
long-arm statute should not be more restrictive than those allowed by federal due
process limitations. U.C.A.1953, 78-27-22.

2. Appeal and Error <s=> 1177(7)
In suit by airplane buyer against,
among others, Pennsylvania corporate manufacturer of airplane for breach of contract
and breach of warranty in which defendant
manufacturer moved to quash service of
process under long-arm statute, conflicting
affidavits of parties concerning facts surrounding transaction and presence of corporate manufacturer in State of Utah required remand of case for purpose of hearing where to resolve conflicts and entry of
findings of fact as to whether manufacturer had subjected itself to jurisdiction of
Utah courts. U.C.A.1953, 78-27-22.

Parsons, Behle & Latimer, F. Alan
Fletcher, Kent W. Winterholler, Salt Lake
City, for plaintiff and appellant.
Christensen, Gardiner, Jensen & Evans,
Ray R. Christensen, Salt Lake City, for
Piper Aircraft.
Snow, Christensen, & Martineau, John H.
Snow, Salt Lake City, for Corpac-West.
WILKINS, Justice:
All statutory references are to Utah Code
Ann., 1953, as amended, unless otherwise
stated.
On or about November 8, 1974, plaintiff,
Abbott G. M. Diesel (hereinafter "Abbott"),
and co-defendant, Piper Corporate Aircraft
Center-West aka Corpac-West (hereinafter
"Corpac"), entered into a purchase agreement wherein Abbott agreed to buy, and
Corpac agreed to sell, a Piper PA-31-P
aircraft manufactured by co-defendant,
Piper Aircraft Corporation (hereinafter
"Piper").
Abbott contends that (1) this aircraft suffered an inordinate number of equipment
and structural failures and defects beginning immediately after its delivery in November of 1974 and continuing regularly
until January 9, 1976, and (2) these failures
make this aircraft unairworthy, unreliable,
not of marketable quality and unfit for its
intended use.

ABBOTT G. M. DIESEL, INC. v. PIPER AIRCRAFT

Utah

851

Cite as 578 P.2d 850

Abbott's counsel wrote several letters to
Piper, copies of which were sent to Corpac,
informing Piper that the aircraft's numerous malfunctions rendered it unsafe and
unacceptable. Piper responded assuring
Abbott that Piper would repair the aircraft
at its expense in an attempt to make it
airworthy. The aircraft was returned to
Piper's plant at Lockhaven, Pennsylvania,
and after Piper performed approximately
thirty different repairs during a three week
period, Piper informed Abbott that the aircraft was in "good as new" condition. On
the return trip of the aircraft to Utah,
Abbott contends that it continued to malfunction.
Abbott commenced action in the District
Court for Salt Lake County on February 23,
1976, against co-defendants Corpac and Piper for damages claiming breach of contract,
breach of warranty, and mutual mistake.
(Abbott claims mutual mistake against Corpac only.) Abbott alleges it paid $308,646.27 for the aircraft and seeks damages
against Piper in the approximate sum of
$192,000.00. The summons was served on
both defendants and specifically on Piper at
its place of business in Pennsylvania pursuant to Section 78-27-24 (Utah's Long-Arm
Statute). Piper argues that it was not subject to the jurisdiction of the Utah courts
under this statute and moved to quash the
service of summons upon it and dismiss the
action for lack of personal jurisdiction. The
District Court granted this motion against
Piper, and Abbott appeals.
In support of its motion to quash, Piper
filed an affidavit of John Leeson, Treasurer
of Piper, the substance of which states that:
Piper is a Pennsylvania corporation engaged in the business of manufacturing airplanes; it has three manufacturing plants,
one in Pennsylvania and two in Florida; it
carries on no business in Utah and has no
employees or agents here; Piper has no
records, bank accounts, investments, property, regional office, or affiliated company
in Utah; there are some independent dealers in Utah who sell Piper Aircraft but that
Piper has no interest in, control over, or
business arrangements with these dealers;
there is an independent corporation known

as Intermountain Piper Incorporated (hereinafter "Intermountain"), authorized under
the laws of the state of Utah and having its
principal place of business in Salt Lake
City, Utah, which acts as a distributor of
Piper aircraft and sells this aircraft to said
dealers; Piper owns no interest in Intermountain and the items of aircraft sold by
Piper to Intermountain are sold F.A.F. (fly
away basis) at Piper's manufacturing
plants.
Abbott, in resisting the motion to quash
filed the affidavit of William Farley, President of Intermountain, the substance of
which states that: Intermountain is a corporation authorized under the laws of Utah;
it is an authorized distributor of Piper by
written contract between these two corporations and allows Intermountain to establish an organization in behalf of Piper for
sale of Piper aircraft and other products
within Utah and elsewhere; Piper initiated
a program known as Piper Flight Centers
for the purpose of establishing flight training in and rental of Piper aircraft, that
program being available to Piper dealers
and other airport operators through Piper
distributors, including Intermountain; Piper encourages its distributors, within their
areas, to establish these centers, and that
there were five such centers in Utah; a
uniform type of sign called "Piper Flite
Center" has been established by Piper for
the centers; said signs are the property of
Intermountain—in its area of responsibility—but become the property of Piper upon
the termination of Intermountain's distributorship; Intermountain has distributed to
these centers information provided by Piper; Piper has authorized the dealers to use
the Piper Flight Center format, design, program, system, lesson plans, and emblems as
encouragement for the residents of Utah to
rent, lease, or purchase Piper aircraft products; Intermountain has handled for transmittal to Piper various warranty items for
Piper from and through such dealers and
has transmitted in behalf of Piper to said
dealers various credits on warranty of Piper
products; Piper employees from time to
time inspect the dealers' facilities in Utah
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for the purpose of approving them as Piper
maintenance facilities or Piper Service Centers; Piper regularly distributes through
the mail notices pertaining to its products
to registered Piper aircraft owners within
Utah.
Abbott also filed an affidavit of Robert
Abbott, President of Abbott, the substance
of which states that: Abbott for several
years has received numerous solicitations by
direct mailing in the form of sales literature and other communications from Piper's
corporation offices at Lockhaven, Pennsylvania; Piper solicits business of Utahns,
including Abbott, through advertisements
placed in nationally circulated trade magazines; and Piper employs a regional sales
representative and a regional service representative, both of whom reside outside of
Utah, who regularly visit Utah at five to
six week intervals to promote customer relations and confer with Piper's sales outlets
with respect to sales and service matters.
The parties disagree in the affidavits
about many of the enumerated facts and
disagree about the inferences to be drawn
therefrom. Abbott contends that either under a "doing business" or "minimum contact" test that Piper has subjected itself to
the jurisdiction of Utah Courts while Piper
contends otherwise. No findings of fact
were made or filed. We therefore reverse
and remand for the purpose of having a
hearing conducted below where conflicts
may be resolved and findings of fact made.
The Utah Legislature enacted the longarm statute in 1969* and it states in Sec.
78-27-24 that any person submits to personal jurisdiction in Utah concerning any
claim arising from the following acts:
(1) The transaction of any business within the state; 2
(2) Contracting to supply services or
goods in this state;
1. Sec. 78-27-22 to 28.

2. Sec. 78-27-23(2) defines "transaction of business within this state" as "activities of a nonresident person, his agents, or representatives
in this state which affect persons or businesses
within the State of Utah".

(3) The causing of any injury within this
state whether tortious or by breach
of warranty;
(4) The ownership, use, or possession of
any real estate situated in this state;
(5) Contracting to insure any person,
property, or risk located within this
state at the time of contracting;
(6) With respect to actions of divorce and
separate maintenance, the maintenance in this state of a matrimonial
domicile at the time the claim arose
or the commission in this state of the
act giving rise to the claim.
Sec. 78-27-22 in a statement of legislative
policy and intent declares that the long-arm
statute "should be applied so as to assert
jurisdiction over nonresident defendants to
the fullest extent permitted by the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution".3
As noted by Professor Kristine Strachan
in her recent able article,4
Prior to enactment of the long-arm
statute there were three primary bases
on which Utah assumed in personam jurisdiction over nonresident defendants.
With respect to nonresident individuals,
Utah assumed personal jurisdiction over
defendants personally served with process
while physically present in the state .
[Additionally] personal jurisdiction could
be asserted over a nonresident defendant
as to tort claims arising out of the use or
operation of a motor vehicle on Utah
highways. Utah also assumed personal
jurisdiction over nonresident defendants
found to be doing business within the
state. [Citations omitted.]
While it is true that this Court has stated
that "if there is any difference between
what is stated as the 'doing business* and
3. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington,
326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945);
McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., 355
U.S. 220, 78 S.Ct. 199, 2 L.Ed.2d 223 (1957),
and Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 78 S.Ct.
1228, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283 (1958).
4. In Personam Jurisdiction in Utah, 1977 Utah
L.Rev. 235-36.
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minimal contact' tests it is probably more
in semantics than in substance," 5 we now
conclude that from an examination of many
individual cases concerning jurisdictional
matters, including the present one, there
can well be a significant and controlling
difference in those two concepts.6
The major concern of the parties is
whether the long-arm statute, ante, applies,
and therefore the discussion in this opinion
basically revolves around that issue.
[1] Though federal due process does not
require this state—or, of course, any
state—to enlarge the scope of personal jurisdiction allowed by the minimum contacts
standard,7 initially announced in International Shoe, ante, still, because our Legislature in 19698 declared in clear, specific, and
mandatory terms that the scope of that
personal jurisdiction should be enlarged "to
the fullest extent permitted by the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment", this Court herein acknowledges that
this state's jurisdictional standards should
not be more restrictive than those allowed
by federal due process limitations.
The minimum contacts test springs from
a measurement of the quality and nature of
the defendant's activities within the forum
state. We return to and cite International
Shoe9 to vivify this point:
It is evident that the criteria by which
we mark the boundary line between those
activities which justify the subjection of
a corporation to suit, and those which do
not, cannot be simply mechanical or
quantitative. The test is not merely, as
5. Hill v. Zale Corp., 25 Utah 2d 357, 360, 482
P.2d 332, 334 (1971).
6. See In Personam Jurisdiction in Utah, supra,
note 4, where the difference between these two
tests is portrayed and documented; also note
particularly the conclusion therein at page 264
where it is stated: "General personal jurisdiction is the concept reflected in a doing business
statute, which requires substantial and continuous local activity; specific personal jurisdiction
is the concept applicable to a long-arm statute,
which requires only minimum local contacts."
Also see at pages 253-54 of this article comments that "Where a defendant's forum-state
activity is extensive, the forum may assert personal jurisdiction on either related or unrelated

has sometimes been suggested, whether
the activity, which the corporation has
seen fit to procure through its agents in
another state, is a little more or a little
less. .
Whether due process is
satisfied must depend rather upon the
quality and nature of the activity in relation to the fair and orderly administration of the laws which it was the purpose
of the due process clause to insure. That
clause does not contemplate that a state
may make binding a judgment in personam against an individual or corporate defendant with which the state has no contacts, ties, or relations.
. . .
But to the extent that a corporation
exercises the privilege of conducting activities within a state, it enjoys the benefits and protection of the laws of that
state. The exercise of that privilege may
give rise to obligations; and, so far as
those obligations arise out of or are connected with the activities within the
state, a procedure which requires the corporation to respond to a suit brought to
enforce them can, in most instances,
hardly be said to be undue. [Emphasis in
original. Citations omitted.]
Hanson v. Denckla,10 in commenting on
the requirement of minimum contacts, further stated:
The application of that rule
will vary with the quality and nature of
the defendant's activity, but it is essential
in each case that there be some act by
which the defendant purposefully avails
itself of the privilege of conducting activclaims (doing business concept). Where the
defendant has only minimum contacts with the
forum, personal jurisdiction may be asserted
only on claims arising out of the defendant's
forum-state activity" (long-arm or "transaction
of business" concept). (Emphasis added—citations omitted.)
7. Perkins v. Benquet Consol. Mining Co., 342
U.S. 437, 446, 72 S.Ct. 413, 96 L.Ed. 485 (1952).
8. Sec. 78-27-22.
9. 326 U.S. at 319, 66 S.Ct at 159.
10. 357 U.S. at 253, 78 S.Ct. at 1240.
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ities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its
laws.
[2] The plaintiff, Abbott, alleges the
commission by Piper of three acts enumerated in Sec. 78-27-24, viz., transaction of
business, contracting to supply services and
goods, and breach of warranty—all within
this state. The long-arm statute can be
invoked only if there are allegations that
one or more of the enumerated acts therein
obtain. Also Abbott's complaint—in substance—alleges that its claims arose from
these enumerated acts.
The District Court, after remand, should
as heretofore directed, conduct a hearing to
resolve the conflicts of facts stated in the
affidavits filed by the parties. And that
hearing should be governed by inquiries
into and a measurement of (a) the nature
and quality of Piper's acts (b) whether Piper engaged in purposeful—rather than unintentional—acts in order to avail itself of
the privileges and protections here (and the
substance—not just form—of Piper's business relationship and acts should be ascertained), and (c) any other relevant mat11. International Shoe, note 3, 326 U.S. at 317,
66 S.Ct. at 158.

ters bearing on " 'notions of fair play and
substantial justice'" n
The comments made herein are made advisedly, notwithstanding any previous adjudications of this Court which may seem to
be to the contrary, and are made in order to
infuse full vitality into the mandate by our
Legislature to apply the long-arm statute to
the fullest extent permitted by the Fourteenth Amendment in order to provide "its
citizens with an effective means of redress
against nonresident persons, who through
certain significant minimal contacts with
this state, incur obligations to citizens entitled to the state's protection".12
Reversed for action below consistent with
this opinion. Costs to Abbott.
ELLETT, C. J., and MAUGHAN,
CROCKETT and HALL, JJ., concur.
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12. Sec. 78-27-22.
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ed income of their subsidiary DISCs discriminates against export shipping from
other States, in violation of the Commerce
Clause. The contrary judgment of the
New York Court of Appeals is therefore
reversed.
Itis so ordered.

466 U-S- 407

personam jurisdiction over corporation in
wrongful death action.
Texas Supreme Court judgment reversed.
Justice Brennan dissented and filed an
opinion.
1. Federal Courts <*=>71
Lack of residential or other contacts
with forum state of itself does not defeat
otherwise proper jurisdiction.

466 VS. 408, 80 LJ2&2d 404
J4P8HEUCOPTEROS NACIONALES DE
COLOMBIA, S J U Petitioner,
v.
Elizabeth HALL et al.
No. 82-1127.
Argued Nov. 8, 1983.
Decided April 24, 1984.
Wrongful death action was instituted
in a Texas state court against a Colombian
corporation and others. Denying Colombian corporation's motion to dismiss actions
for lack of in personam jurisdiction over it,
the District Court, Harris County, Wyatt
H. Heard, J., entered judgment against corporation on a jury verdict in favor of plaintiffs. Corporation appealed. The Texas
Court of Civil Appeals, 616 S.W.2d 247,
reversed and dismissed case for lack of
jurisdiction, and plaintiffs appealed. The
Texas Supreme Court, 638 S.W.2d 870, reversed. Certiorari was granted. The Supreme Court, Justice Blackmun, held that
Colombian corporation's contacts with Texas, which consisted of one trip to Texas by
corporation's chief executive officer for
purpose of negotiating transportation services contract, acceptance of checks drawn
on Texas bank, and purchases of helicopters and equipment from Texas manufacturer and related training trips, were insufficient to satisfy requirements of due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
and hence to allow Texas court to assert in

2. Constitutional Law <s=>305<5)
Due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment operates to limit the power of
a state to assert in personam jurisdiction
over a nonresident defendant U.S.C.A.
ConstAmend. 14.
3. Constitutional Law <s=>305(6)
Due process requirements are satisfied
when in personam jurisdiction is asserted
over a nonresident corporate defendant
that has certain minimum contacts with the
forum such that the maintenance of the
suit does not offend traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice. U.S.C.A.
ConstAmend. 14.
4. Constitutional Law *»305(6)
Colombian corporation's contacts with
Texas, which consisted of one trip to Texas
by corporation's chief executive officer for
purpose of negotiating transportation services contract, acceptance of checks drawn
on Texas bank, and purchases of helicopters and equipment from Texas manufacturer and related training trips, were insufficient to satisfy requirements of due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
and hence to allow Texas court to assert in
personam jurisdiction over corporation in
wrongful death action. U.S.C.A. Const
Amend. 14.
5. Federal Courts «=>76.10
Unilateral activity of another party or
a third person is not an appropriate consideration when determining whether a defendant has sufficient contacts with a forum state to justify an assertion of jurisdiction. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 14.
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6. Federal Courts <s=>84
Mere purchases in forum state, even if
occurring at regular intervals, are not
enough to warrant state's assertion of in
personam jurisdiction over nonresident corporation in cause of action not related to
those purchase transactions. U.S.CA.
ConstAmend. 14.
Syllables *
Petitioner, a Colombian corporation,
entered into a contract to provide helicopter
transportation for a Peruvian consortium,
the alter ego of a joint venture that had its
headquarters in Houston, Tex., during the
consortium's construction of a pipeline in
Peru for a Peruvian state-owned oil company. Petitioner has no place of business in
Texas and never has been licensed to do
business there. Its only contacts with the
State consisted of sending its chief executive officer to Houston to negotiate the
contract with the consortium, accepting
into its New York bank account checks
drawn by the consortium on a Texas bank,
purchasing helicopters, equipment, and
training services from a Texas manufacturer, and sending personnel to that manufacturer's facilities for training. After a helicopter owned by petitioner crashed in Peru,
resulting in the death of respondents' decedents—United States citizens who were
employed by the consortium—respondents
instituted wrongful-death actions in a Texas state court against the consortium, the
Texas manufacturer, and petitioner. Denying petitioner's motion to dismiss the actions for lack of in personam jurisdiction
over it, the trial court entered judgment
against petitioner on a jury verdict in favor
of respondents. The Texas Court of Civil
Appeals reversed, holding that in personam jurisdiction over petitioner was lacking,
but in turn was reversed by the Texas
Supreme Court
Held: Petitioner's contacts with Texas
were insufficient to satisfy the requirements of the Due Process Clause of the
* The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion
of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the

Fourteenth Amendment and hence to allow
the Texas court to assert in personam
jurisdiction over petitioner. The one trip to
Houston by petitioner's chief executive officer for the purpose of negotiating the
transportation services contract cannot be
regarded as a contact of a "continuous and
systematic" nature, and thus cannot support an assertion of general jurisdiction.
Similarly, petitioner's acceptance of checks
drawn on a Texas bank is of negligible
significance for purposes of determining
whether petitioner had sufficient contacts
in Texas. Nor were petitioner's purchases
of helicopters and equipment from the Texas manufacturer and the related training
trips a sufficient basis for the Texas
court's assertion of jurisdiction. Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. Curtis Brown Co., 260
U.S. 516, 43 S.Ct 170, 67 L.EA 372. Mere
purchases, even if occurring at regular intervals, are not enough to warrant 1409a
State's assertion of in personam jurisdiction over a nonresident corporation in a
cause of action not related to the purchases. And the fact that petitioner sent personnel to Texas for training in connection
with the purchases did not enhance the
nature of petitioner's contacts with Texas.
Pp. 1872-1874.
638 S.W.2d 870 (Tex.1982), reversed.
Thomas J. Whalen, New York City, for
petitioner.
George E. Pletcher, Houston, Tex., for
respondents.
Justice BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court
We granted certiorari in this case, 460
U.S. 1021, 103 S.Ct 1270, 75 L.E<L2d 493
(1983), to decide whether the Supreme
Court of Texas correctly ruled that the
contacts of a foreign corporation with the
State of Texas were sufficient to allow a
Texas state court to assert jurisdiction over
the corporation in a cause of action not
reader. See United States v. Detroit Lumber Go*
200 VS. 321. 337, 26 S.O. 2S2, 287, 50 UEd.
499.
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arising out of or related to the corporation's activities within the State.
I
Petitioner Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. (Helicol), is a Colombian corporation with its principal place of business in
the city of Bogota in that country. It is
engaged in the business of providing helicopter transportation for oil and construction companies in South America. On
j^ioJanuary 26, 1976, a helicopter owned by
Helicol crashed in Peru. Four United
States citizens were among those who lost
their lives in the accident Respondents
are the survivors and representatives of
the four decedents.
At the time of the crash, respondents'
decedents were employed by Consorcio, a
Peruvian consortium, and were working on
a pipeline in Peru. Consorcio is the alter
ego of a joint venture named Williams-Sedco-Horn (WSH).1 The venture had its headquarters in Houston, Tex. Consorcio had
been formed to enable the venturers to
enter into a contract with Petro Peru, the
Peruvian state-owned oil company. Consorcio was to construct a pipeline for Petro
Peru running from the interior of Peru
westward to the Pacific Ocean. Peruvian
law forbade construction of the pipeline by
any non-Peruvian entity.
Consorcio/WSH2 needed helicopters to
move personnel, materials, and equipment
into and out of the construction area. In
1974, upon request of Consorcio/WSH, the
chief executive officer of Helicol, Francisco
Restrepo, flew to the United States and
conferred in Houston with representatives
of the three joint venturers. At that meeting, there was a discussion of prices, availability, working conditions, fuel, supplies,
and housing. Restrepo represented that
1. The participants in the joint venture were
Williams International Sudamericana, Ltd-, a
Delaware corporation; Sedco Construction Corporation, a Texas corporation; and Horn international, Inc., a Texas corporation.
2. Throughout the record in this case the entity
is referred to both as Consorcio and as WSH.
We refer to it hereinafter as Consorcio/WSH.

466UJS.409

Helicol could have the first helicopter on
the job in 15 days. The Consorcio/WSH
representatives decided to accept the contract proposed by Restrepo. Helicol began
performing before the agreement was formally signed in Peru on November 11,
1974.3 The contract was written in Spanish
on Unofficial government stationery and
provided that the residence of all the parties would be Lima, Peru. It further stated that controversies arising out of the
contract would be submitted to the jurisdiction of Peruvian courts. In addition, it
provided that Consorcio/WSH would make
payments to Hehcol's account with the
Bank of America in New York City. App.
12a.
Aside from the negotiation session in
Houston between Restrepo and the representatives of Consorcio/WSH, Helicol had
other contacts with Texas. During the
years. 1970-1977, it ^urcha&ed tetiea^ters.
(approximately 80% of its fleet), spare
parts, and accessories for more than $4
million from Bell Helicopter Company in
Fort Worth. In that period, Helicol sent
prospective pilots to Fort Worth for training and to ferry the aircraft to South
America. It also sent management and
maintenance personnel to visit Bell Helicopter in Fort Worth during the same period in
order to receive "plant familiarization" and
for technical consultation. Helicol received
into its New York City and Panama City,
Fla., bank accounts over $5 million in payments from Consorcio/WSH drawn upon
First City National Bank of Houston.
[1] Beyond the foregoing, there have
been no other business contacts between
Helicol and the State of Texas. Helicol
never has been authorized to do business in
Texas and never has had an agent for the
3. Respondents acknowledge that the contract
was executed in Peru and not in the United
States. Tr. of Oral Arg. 22-23. See App. 79a;
Brief for Respondents 3.
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service of process within the State. It never has performed helicopter operations in
Texas or sold any product that reached
Texas, never solicited business in Texas,
never signed any contract in Texas, never
had any employee based there, and never
recruited an employee in Texas. In addition, Helicol never has owned real or personal property in Texas and never has
maintained an office or establishment
there. Helicol has maintained no records
in Texas and has no shareholders in that
State.4 None of the | ^respondents or
their decedents were domiciled in Texas,
Tr. of Oral Arg. 17, 18,5 but all of the
decedents were hired in Houston by
Consorcio/WSH to work on the Petro Peru
pipeline project
Respondents instituted wrongful-death
actions in the District Court of Harris
County, Tex., against Consorcio/WSH, Bell
Helicopter Company, and Helicol. Helicol
filed special appearances and moved to dismiss the actions for lack of in personam
jurisdiction over it The motion was de-

nied. After a consolidated jury trial, judgment was entered against Helicol on a jury
verdict of $1,141,200 in favor of respondents.6 App. 174a.
The Texas Court of Civil Appeals, Houston, First District, reversed the judgment
of the District Court, holding that in personam jurisdiction over Helicol was lacking. 616 S.W.2d 247 (Tex.1981). The Supreme Court of Texas, with three justices
dissenting, initially affirmed the judgment
of the Court of Civil Appeals. App. to Pet
for Cert 46a-62a. Seven months later,
however, on motion for rehearing, the
court withdrew its prior opinions and, again
with three justices dissenting, reversed the
judgment of the intermediate court 638
S.W.2d 870 (Tex.1982). In ruling that the
Texas courts had U\&in personam jurisdiction, the Texas Supreme Court first held
that the State's long-arm statute reaches
as far as the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment permits. Id., at
872.7 Thus, the only question remaining

4. The Colombian national airline, Aerovias Nacionales de Colombia, owns approximately 94%
of Helicol's capital stock. The remainder is
held by Aerovias Corporation de Viajes and
four South American individuals. See Brief for
Petitioner 2, n. 2.

"Sec. 3. Any foreign corporation ... that engages in business in this State, irrespective of
any Statute or law respecting designation or
maintenance of resident agents, and does not
maintain a place of regular business in this
State or a designated agent upon whom service
may be made upon causes of action arising out
of such business done in this State, the act or
acts of engaging in such business within this
State shall be deemed equivalent to an appointment by such foreign corporation ... of the
Secretary of State of Texas as agent upon whom
service of process may be made in any action,
suit or proceedings arising out of such business
done in this State, wherein such corporation ...
is a party or is to be made a party.
"Sec. 4. For the purpose of this Act and
without including other acts that may constitute
doing business, any foreign corporation ...
shall be deemed doing business in this State by
entering into contract by mail or otherwise with
a resident of Texas to be performed in whole or
in part by either party in this State, or the
committing of any tort in whole or in part in
this State. The act of recruiting Texas residents,
directly or through an intermediary located in
Texas, for employment inside or outside of Texas shall be deemed doing business in this State."
The last sentence of § 4 was added by 1979
Tex.GenJLaws, ch. 245, § 1, and became effective August 27, 1979.
The Supreme Court of Texas in its principal
opinion relied upon rulings in (/-Anchor Adver-

5. Respondents' lack of residential or other contacts with Texas of itself does not defeat otherwise proper jurisdiction. Keeton v. Hustler
Magazine, Inc., 465 US. 770, 780, 104 S.0.1473,
1481, 79 L.Ed.2d 790 (1984); Colder v. Jones,
465 U.S. 783, 788, 104 S.O. 1482, 1486. 79
L.EcL2d 804 (1984). We mention respondents'
lack of contacts merely to show that nothing in
the nature of the relationship between respondents and Helicol could possibly enhance Helicol's contacts with Texas. The harm suffered by
respondents did not occur in Texas. Nor is it
alleged that any negligence on the part of Helicol took place in Texas.
6. Defendants Consorcio/WSH and Bell Helicopter Company were granted directed verdicts
with respect to respondents' claims against
them. Bell Helicopter was granted a directed
verdict on Helicol's cross-claim against it. App.
167a. Consorcio/WSH, as cross-plaintiff in a
claim against Helicol, obtained a judgment in
the amount of $70,000. IcL, at 174a.
7. The State's long-arm statute is TexJUv.Civ.
StatAnn., Art. 2031b (Vernon 1964 and Supp.
1982-1983). It reads in relevant part:
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for the court to decide was whether it was
consistent with the Due Process Clause for
Texas courts to assert in personam jurisdiction over Helicol. Ibid.
II
[2,3] The Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment operates to limit
the power of a State to assert in personam
14iJurisdiction over a nonresident defendant Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 24
L.Ed. 565 (1878). Due process requirements are satisfied when in personam jurisdiction is asserted over a nonresident corporate defendant that has "certain minimum contacts with [the forum] such that
the maintenance of the suit does not offend
'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice/ " International Shoe Co.
v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct
154,158, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945), quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463, 61 S.Ct 339,
342, 85 L.Ed. 278 (1940). When a controversy is related to or "arises out o f a
defendant's contacts with the forum, the
Court has said that a "relationship among
the defendant, the forum, and the litigation" is the essential foundation of in personam jurisdiction. Shaffer v. Heitner,
433 U.S. 186, 204, 97 S.Ct 2569, 2579, 53
L.Ed.2d 683 (1977).*
Even when the cause of action does not
arise out of or relate to the foreign corporation's activities in the forum State,9 due
process is not offended by a State's subjecting the corporation to its in personam
jurisdiction when there are sufficient contising, Inc. v. Burt, 553 S.W.2d 760 (Tex.1977);
Hoppenfeld v. Crook, 498 S.W.2d 52 (TexXiv.
App.1973); and O'Brien v. Lanpar Co., 399
S.W.2d 340 (Tex.1966). It is not within our
province, of course, to determine whether the
Texas Supreme Court correctly interpreted the
State's long-arm statute. We therefore accept
that court's holding that the limits of the Texas
statute are coextensive with those of the Due
Process Clause.
8- It has been said that when a State exercises
personal jurisdiction over a defendant in a suit
arising out of or related to the defendant's contacts with the forum, the State is exercising
"specific jurisdiction" over the defendant See
Von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adju-
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tacts between the State and the foreign
corporation. Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 72 S.Ct
413, 96 L.Ed. 485 (1952); see Keeton v.
Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 779780, 104 S.Ct 1473, 1480-1481, 79 L.Ed.2d
790 (1984). In Perkins, the Court addressed a situation in which state courts
had asserted general jurisdiction over a
defendant foreign corporation. During the
Japapese4is occupation of the Philippine Islands, the president and general manager
of a Philippine mining corporation maintained an office in Ohio from which he
conducted activities on behalf of the company. He kept company files and held directors' meetings in the office, carried on
correspondence relating to the business,
distributed salary checks drawn on two active Ohio bank accounts, engaged an Ohio
bank to act as transfer agent, and supervised policies dealing with the rehabilitation of the corporation's properties in the
Philippines. In short, the foreign corporation, through its president, "ha[d] been
carrying on in Ohio a continuous and systematic, but limited, part of its general
business," and the exercise of general jurisdiction over the Philippine corporation by
an Ohio court was "reasonable and just"
342 U.S., at 438, 445, 72 S.Ct, at 414, 418.
[4] All parties to the present case concede that respondents' claims against Helicol did not "arise out of," and are not
related to, Helicol's activities within Texas.10 We thus must Uisexplore the nature
dicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 Harv.L.Rev.
1121, 1144-1164 (1966).
9. When a State exercises personal jurisdiction
over a defendant in a suit not arising out of or
related to the defendant's contacts with the forum, the State has been said to be exercising
"general jurisdiction" over the defendant See
Brilmayer, How Contacts Count: Due Process
Limitations on State Court Jurisdiction, 1980
S.CtRev. 77, 80-31; Von Mehren & Trautman,
79 HarvX.Rev.. at 1136-1144; Colder v. Jones,
465 VS., at 786,104 S.CL, at 1485.
10. See Brief for Respondents 14; Tr. of Oral
Arg. 26-27, 30-31. Because the parties have not
argued any relationship between the cause of
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of Helicol's contacts with the State of Texas to determine whether they constitute the
kind of continuous and systematic general
business contacts the Court found to exist
in Perkins. We hold that they do not
It is undisputed that Helicol does not
have a place of business in Texas and never
has been licensed to do business in the
State. Basically, Helicol's contacts with
Texas consisted of sending its chief executive officer to Houston for a contract-negotiation session; accepting into its New
York bank account checks drawn on a
Houston bank; purchasing helicopters,
equipment, and training services from Bell
Helicopter for substantial sums; and sending personnel to Bell's facilities in Fort
Worth for training.
[5] The one trip to Houston by Helicol's
chief executive officer for the purpose of
negotiating the transportation-services contract with Consorcio/WSH cannot be described or regarded as a contact of a "continuous and systematic" nature, as Perkins
described it, see also International Shoe
Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S., at 320, 66
S.Ct, at 160, and thus cannot support an
assertion of in personam jurisdiction over
Helicol by a Texas court Similarly, Helicol's acceptance from Consorcio/WSH of
checks drawn on a Texas bank is of negligible significance for purposes of determining whether Helicol had sufficient contacts
action and Helicol's contacts with the State of
Texas, we, contrary to the dissent's implication,
post, at 1873, assert no "view" with respect to
that issue.
The dissent suggests that we have erred in
drawing no distinction between controversies
that "relate to" a defendants contacts with a
forum and those that "arise out of* such contacts. Post at 1875. This criticism is somewhat
puzzling, for the dissent goes on to urge that, for
purposes of determining the constitutional validity of an assertion of specific jurisdiction,
there really should be no distinction between
the two. Post, at 1879.
We do not address the validity or consequences of such a distinction because the issue
has not been presented in this case. Respondents have made no argument that their cause
of action either arose out of or is related to
Helicol's contacts with the State of Texas. Absent any briefing on the issue, we decline to

in Texas. There is no indication that Helicol ever requested that the checks be
drawn on a Texas bank or that there was
any negotiation between Helicol and
Consorcio/WSH with respect to the location or identity of the bank on which checks
would be drawn. Common sense and
everyday experience suggest that absent
unusual circumstances,11 the bank on which
a check is drawn is generally of little
Urrconsequence to the payee and is a matter left to the discretion of the drawer.
Such unilateral activity of another party or
ajbhird person is not an appropriate consideration when determining whether a defendant has sufficient contacts^ .wjth_a _fpnim "State to justify an assertion, oljurisr
diction. See Kulko v. California Superior
Court, 436 U.S. 84, 93, 98 S.Ct 1690,1697,
56 UEA2d 132 (1978) (arbitrary to subject
one parent to suit in any State where other
parent chooses to spend time while having
custody of child pursuant to separation
agreement); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S.
235, 253, 78 STCr-I228T123g; 2 LEA2d
1283 (1958) ('The unilateral activity of
those who claim some relationship with a
nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the
requirement of contact with the_ fqriun
State"); see also Lilly, Jurisdiction Over
Domestic and Alien Defendants, 69 VaX.
Rev. 85, 99 (1983).
The Texas Supreme Court focused on the
purchases and the related training trips in
reach the questions (1) whether the terms "arising out o^ and "related to" describe different
connections between a cause of action and a
defendant's contacts with a forum, and (2) what
sort of tie between a cause of action and a
defendant's contacts with a forum is necessary
to a determination that either connection exists,
Nor do we reach the question whether, if the
two types of relationship differ, a forum's exercise of personal jurisdiction in a situation where
the cause of action "relates to," but does not
"arise out of," the defendant's contacts with the
forum should be analyzed as an assertion of
specific jurisdiction.
11. For example, if the financial health and continued ability of the bank to honor the draft are
questionable, the payee might request that the
check be drawn on an account at some other
institution.
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finding contacts sufficient to support an
assertion of jurisdiction. We do not agree
with that assessment, for the Court's opinion in Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. Curtis
Brown Co., 260 U.S. 516, 43 S.Ct 170, 67
L.Ed. 372 (1923) (Brandeis, J., for a unanimous tribunal), makes clear that purchases
and related trips, standing alone, are not a
sufficient basis for a State's assertion of
jurisdiction.
The defendant in Rosenberg was a small
retailer in Tulsa, Okla., who dealt in men's
clothing and furnishings. It never had applied for a license to do business in New
York, nor had it at any time authorized suit
to be brought against it there. It never
had an established place of business in
New York and never regularly carried on
business in that State. Its only connection
with New York was that it purchased from
New York wholesalers a large portion of
the merchandise sold in its Tulsa store.
The purchases sometimes were made by
correspondence and sometimes through visits to New York by an officer of the defendant The Court concluded: "Visits on
such business, even if occurring at regular
intervals, would not warrant the inference
that the corporation was present within the
jurisdiction of [New York]." Id., at 518, 43
S.Ct, at 171.
[63 UisThis Court in International
Shoe acknowledged and did not repudiate
its holding in Rosenberg. See 326 U.S., at
318, 66 S.Ct, at 159. In accordance with
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Rosenberg, we hold that mere purchases,
even if occurring at regular intervals, are
not enough to warrant a State's assertion
of in personam jurisdiction over a nonresident corporation in a cause of action not
related to those purchase transactions.12
Nor can we conclude that the fact that
Helicol sent personnel into Texas for training in connection with the purchase of helicopters and equipment in that State in any
way enhanced the nature of Helicol's contacts with Texas. The training was a part
of the package of goods and services purchased by Helicol from Bell Helicopter.
The brief presence of Helicol employees in
Texas for the purpose of attending the
training sessions is no more a significant
contact than were the trips to New York
made by the buyer for the retail store in
Rosenberg. See also Kulko v. California
Superior Court, 436 U.S., at 93, 98 S.Ct,
at 1697 (basing California jurisdiction on
3-day and 1-day stopovers in that State
"would make a mockery o f due process
limitations on assertion of personal jurisdiction).
HI
We hold that Helicol's contacts with the
State of Texas were insufficient to satisfy
the requirements of the Due Proqsss4i9
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment13
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of
the Supreme Court of Texas.
It is so ordered.

12. This Court in International Shoe cited Rosen- 13. As an alternative to traditional minimumberg for the proposition that "the commission of
contacts analysis, respondents suggest that the
some single or occasional acts of the corporate
Court hold that the State of Texas had personal
agent in a state sufficient to impose an oblijurisdiction over Helicol under a doctrine of
gation or liability on the corporation has not
"jurisdiction by necessity.,, See Shaffer v. Heitbeen thought to confer upon the state authority
nert 433 VS. 186, 211. n. 37, 97 S.Ct 2569, 2583,
to enforce i f 326 U.S., at 318, 66 S.O., at 159.
n. 37, 53 UEd.2d 683 (1977). We conclude,
Arguably, therefore, Rosenberg also stands for
however, that respondents failed to carry their
the proposition that mere purchases are not a
burden of showing that all three defendants
sufficient basis for either general or specific
could not be sued together in a single forum. It
jurisdiction. Because the case before us is one
is not clear from the record, for example,
in which there has been an assertion of general
whether suit could have been brought against
jurisdiction over a foreign defendant, we need
all three defendants in either Colombia or Peru.
not decide the continuing validity of Rosenberg
We decline to consider adoption of a doctrine of
with respect to an assertion of specific jurisdicjurisdiction by necessity—a potentially fartion, Le., where the cause of action arises out of
reaching modification of existing law—in the
or relates to the purchases by the defendant in
absence of a more complete record.
the forum State.
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Justice BRENNAN, dissenting.
Decisions applying the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to
determine whether a State may constitutionally assert in personam jurisdiction
over a particular defendant for a particular
* cause of action most often turn on a weighing of facts. See, e.g., Kulko v. California
Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 92, 98 S.Ct.
1690, 1697, 56 L.Ed.2d 132 (1978); id, at
101-102, 98 S.Ct, at 1701-1702 (BRENNAN, J., dissenting). To a large extent,
today's decision follows the usual pattern.
Based on essentially undisputed facts, the
Court concludes that petitioner Helicol's
contacts with the State of Texas were insufficient to allow the Texas state courts
constitutionally to assert "general jurisdiction" over all claims filed against this foreign corporation. Although my independent weighing of the facts leads me to a
different conclusion, see infra, at 1877, the
Court's holding on this issue is neither implausible nor unexpected.
What is troubling about the Court's opinion, however, are the implications that
might be drawn from the way in which the
Court approaches the constitutional issue it
addresses. First, the Court limits its discussion to an assertion of general jurisdiction of the Texas courts because, in its
view, the ^underlying cause of action
does "not arisfe] out of or relatfe] to the
corporation's activities within the State."
Ante, at 1870. Then, the Court relies on a
1923 decision in Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v.
Curtis Brown Co., 260 U.S. 516, 43 S.Ct
170, 67 LEd. 372, without considering
whether that case retains any validity after
our more recent pronouncements concerning the permissible reach of a State's jurisdiction. By posing and deciding the question presented in this manner, I fear that
the Court is saying more than it realizes
about constitutional limitations on the potential reach of in personam jurisdiction.
In particular, by relying on a precedent
whose premises have long been discarded,
and by refusing to consider any distinction
between controversies that "relate to" a
defendant's contacts with the forum and

causes of action that "arise out o f such
contacts, the Court may be placing severe
limitations on the type and amount of contacts that will satisfy the constitutional
minimum.
In contrast, I believe that the undisputed
contacts in this case between petitioner
Helicol and the State of Texas are sufficiently important, and sufficiently related
to the underlying cause of action, to make
it fair and reasonable for the State to assert personal jurisdiction over Helicol for
the wrongful-death actions filed by the respondents. Given that Helicol has purposefully availed itself of the benefits and obligations of the forum, and given the direct
relationship between the underlying cause
of action and Helicol's contacts with the
forum, maintenance of this suit in the Texas courts "does not offend [the] 'traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice/" International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct 154, 90
L.Ed. 95 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer,
311 U.S. 457, 463, 61 S.Ct 339, 342, 85
L.Ed. 278 (1940)), that are the touchstone
of jurisdictional analysis under the Due
Process Clause. I therefore dissent
I
The Court expressly limits its decision in
this case to "an assertion of general jurisdiction over a foreign defendant" j ^ i
Ante, at 1874, n. 12. See ante, at 1873,
and n. 10. Having framed the question in
this way, the Court is obliged to address
our prior holdings in Perkins v. Benguet
Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 72
S.Ct 413, 96 L.EA 485 (1952), and Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. Curtis Brown Co.,
supra. In Perkins, the Court considered a
State's assertion of general jurisdiction
over a foreign corporation that "ha[d] been
carrying on . . . a continuous and systematic, but limited, part of its general business" in the forum. 342 U.S., at 438, 72
S.Ct, at 414. Under the circumstances of
that case, we held that such contacts were
constitutionally sufficient "to make it reasonable and just to subject the corporation
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to the jurisdiction" of that State. Id., at
445, 72 S.Ct, at 418 (citing International
Shoe, supra, 326 U.S., at 317-320, 66 S.Ct,
at 158-160). Nothing in Perkins suggests,
however, that such "continuous and systematic" contacts are a necessary minimum
before a State may constitutionally assert
general jurisdiction over a foreign corporation.
The Court therefore looks for guidance
to our 1923 decision in Rosenberg, supra,
which until today was of dubious validity
given the subsequent expansion of personal
jurisdiction that began with International
Shoe, supra, in 1945. In Rosenberg, the
Court held that a company's purchases
within a State, even when combined with
related trips to the State by company officials, would not allow the courts of that
State to assert general jurisdiction over all
claims against the nonresident corporate
defendant making those purchases.1
^Reasoning by analogy, the Court in this
case concludes that Helicors contacts with
the State of Texas are no more significant
than the purchases made by the defendant
in Rosenberg. The Court makes no attempt, however, to ascertain whether the
narrow view of in personam jurisdiction
adopted by the Court in Rosenberg comports with "the fundamental transformation of our national economy" that has
occurred since 1923. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222-223,
78 S.Ct 199, 200-201, 2 L.Ed.2d 223 (1957).
See also World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292-293, 100 S.Ct
559, 564-565, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980); id., at
308-309,100 S.Ct, at 585-586 (BRENNAN,
J., dissenting); Hanson v. Denckla, 357
U.S. 235, 250-251, 78 S.Ct 1228,1237-1238,
1. The Court leaves open the question whether
the decision in Rosenberg was intended to address any constitutional limits on an assertion
of "specific jurisdiction." Ante, at 1874, n. 12
(citing International Shoe, 326 U.S., at 318, 66
S.Ct., at 159). If anything is clear from Justice
Brandeis' opinion for the Court in Rosenberg,
however, it is that the Court was concerned only
with general jurisdiction over the corporate defendant See 260 U.S., at 517, 43 S.Ct, at 171
(The sole question for decision is whether ...
defendant was doing business within the State

466 U.S. 421

2 L.Ed.2d 1283 (1958); id, at 260, 78 S.Ct,
at 1243 (Black, J., dissenting). This failure,
in my view, is fatal to the Court's analysis.
The vast expansion of our national economy during the past several decades has
provided the primary rationale for expanding the permissible reach of a State's jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause. By
broadening the type and amount of business opportunities available to participants
in interstate and foreign commerce, our
economy has increased the frequency with
which foreign corporations actively pursue
commercial transactions throughout the
various States. In turn, it has become both
necessary and, in my view, desirable to
allow the States more leeway in bringing
the activities of these nonresident corporations within the scope of their respective
jurisdictions.
This is neither a unique nor a novel idea.
As the Court first noted in 1957:
"[M]any commercial transactions touch
two or more States and may involve parties separated by the full continent
With this increasing nationalization of
commerce has come a great increase in
the amount of business conducted by
mail across state lines. At thej^same
time modern transportation and communication have made it much less burdensome for a party sued to defend himself
in a State where he engages in economic
activity." McGee, supra, at 222-223, 78
S.Ct, at 200-201.
See also World-Wide Volkswagen, supra,
444 U.S., at 293,100 S.Ct, at 565 (reaffirming that "[t]he historical developments noted in McGee . . . have only accelerated in
the generation since that case was decidof New York in such manner and to such extent
as to warrant the inference that it was present
there"); id., at 518, 43 S.Ct, at 171 (the corporation's contacts with the forum "would not warrant the inference that the corporation was
present within the jurisdiction of the State");
ante, at 1874. The Court's resuscitation of
Rosenberg, therefore, should have no bearing
upon any forum's assertion of jurisdiction over
claims that arise out of or relate to a defendant's
contacts with the State.
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ed"); Hanson v. Denckla, supra, 357 U.S.,
at 250-251, 78 S.Ct, at 1237-1238.
Moreover, this "trend ... toward expanding the permissible scope of state jurisdiction over foreign corporations and other nonresidents," McGee, supra, 355 U.S.,
at 222, 78 S.Ct, at 200, is entirely consistent with the "traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice," International Shoe, 326 U.S., at 316, 66 S.Ct, at 158,
that control our inquiry under the Due
Process Clause. As active participants in
interstate and foreign commerce take advantage of the economic benefits and opportunities offered by the various States, it
is only fair and reasonable to subject them
to the obligations that may be imposed by
those jurisdictions. And chief among the
obligations that a nonresident corporation
should expect to fulfill is amenability to
suit in any forum that is significantly affected by the corporation's commercial activities.
As a foreign corporation that has actively and purposefully engaged in numerous
and frequent commercial transactions in
the State of Texas, Helicol clearly falls
within the* category of nonresident defendants that may be subject to that forum's
general jurisdiction. Helicol not only purchased helicopters and other equipment in
the State for many years, but also sent
pilots and management personnel into Texas to be trained in the use of this equipment and to consult with the seller on
technical matters.2 Moreover, negotiations
for the ^contract under which Helicol pro2. Although the Court takes note of these contacts, it concludes that they did not Menhanc[e]
the nature of Hellcol's contacts with Texas [because the] training was a part of the package of
goods and services purchased by HelicoL"
Ante, at 1874. Presumably, the Court's statement simply recognizes that participation in today's interdependent markets often necessitates
the use of complicated purchase contracts that
provide for numerous contacts between representatives of the buyer and seller, as well as
training for related personnel. Ironically, however, while relying on these modern-day realities to denigrate the significance of Heiicol's
contacts with the forum, the Court refuses to
acknowledge that these same realities require a

vided transportation services to the joint
venture that employed the respondents' decedents also took place in the State of
Texas. Taken together, these contacts
demonstrate that Helicol obtained numerous benefits from its transaction of business in Texas. In turn, it is eminently fair
and reasonable to expect Helicol to face the
obligations that attach to its participation
in such commercial transactions. Accordingly, on the basis of continuous commercial contacts with the forum, I would conclude that the Due Process Clause allows
the State of Texas to assert general jurisdiction over petitioner Helicol.
II
The Court also fails to distinguish the
legal principles that controlled our prior
decisions in Perkins and Rosenberg. In
particular, the contacts between petitioner
Helicol and the State of Texas, unlike the
contacts between the defendant and the
forum in each of those cases, are significantly related to the cause of action alleged
in the original suitfiledby the respondents.
Accordingly, in my view, it is both fair and
reasonable for the Texas courts to assert
specific jurisdiction over Helicol in this
case.
By asserting that the present case does
not implicate the specific jurisdiction of the
Texas courts, see ante, at 1872-1873, and
nn. 10 and 12, the Court necessarily removes its decision i42sfrom the reality of
the actual facts presented for our consideration.* Moreover, the Court refuses to conconcomitant expansion in a forum's jurisdictional reach. See supra* at 1876-1877. As a
result when deciding that the balance in this
case must be struck against jurisdiction, the
Court loses sight of the ultimate inquiry: whether it is fair and reasonable to subject a nonresident corporate defendant to the jurisdiction of a
State when that defendant has purposefully
availed itself of the benefits and obligations of
that particular forum. Cf. Hanson v. Denckla,
357 US. 235,253,78 S.CL 1228, 1239,2 LE<L2d
1283 (1958).
3. Nor do I agree with the Court that the respondents have conceded that their claims are not
related to Heiicol's activities within the State of
Texas. Although parts of their written and oral
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aider any distinction between contacts that
are "related to" the underlying cause of
action and contacts that "give rise" to the
underlying cause of action. In my view,
however, there is a substantial difference
between these two standards for asserting
specific jurisdiction. Thus, although I
agree that the respondents' cause of action
did not formally "arise out o f specific
activities initiated by Helicol in the State of
Texas, I believe that the wrongful-death
claim filed by the respondents is significantly related to the undisputed contacts
between Helicol and' the forum. On that
basis, I would conclude that the Due Process Clause allows the Texas courts to assert specific jurisdiction over this particular
action.
The wrongful-death actions filed by the
respondents were premised on a fatal helicopter crash that occurred in Peru. Helicol
was joined as a defendant in the lawsuits
because it provided transportation services,
including the particular helicopter and pilot
involved in the crash, to the joint venture
Uathat employed the decedents. Specifically, the respondent Hall claimed in her original complaint that "Helicol is . . . legally
responsible for its own negligence through
its pilot employee." App. 6a. Viewed in
light of these allegations, the contacts between Helicol and the State of Texas are
directly and significantly related to the underlying claim filed by the respondents.
The negotiations that took place in Texas
led to the contract in which Helicol agreed

to provide the precise transportation services that were being used at the time of the
crash. Moreover, the helicopter involved in
the crash was purchased by Helicol in Texas, and the pilot whose negligence was
alleged to have caused the crash was actually trained in Texas. See Tr. of Oral Arg.
5, 22. This is simply not a case, therefore,
in which a state court has asserted jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant on the
basis of wholly unrelated contacts with the
forum. Rather, the contacts between Helicol and the forum are directly related to
the negligence that was alleged in the respondent Hail's original complaint4 Because Helicol should have expected to be
amenable to suit in the Texas courts for
claims directly related to these contacts, it
is fair and reasonable to allow the assertion
of jurisdiction in this case.
Despite this substantial relationship between the contacts and the cause of action,
the Court declines to consider whether the
courts of Texas may assert specific jurisdiction over this suit Apparently, tins simply reflects a narrow interpretation of the
question presented for review. See ante,
at 1873, IL 10. It is nonetheless possible
that the Court's opinion may be read to
imply that the specific jurisdiction of the
Texas courts is inapplicable because the
cause of action |^gdid not formally "arise
out o f the contacts between Helicol and
the forum. In my view, however, such a
rule would place unjustifiable limits on the

arguments before the Court proceed on the assumption that no such relationship exists, other
portions suggest just the opposite:
If it is the concern of the Solicitor General
[appearing for the United States as amicus curiae] that a holding for Respondents here will
cause foreign companies to refrain from purchasing in the United States for fear of exposure
to general jurisdiction on unrelated causes of
action, such concern is not well founded.
"Respondents' cause is not dependent on a
ruling that mere purchases in a state, together
with incidental training for operating and maintaining the iTTr>haru^<*> purchased <*si»* constitute the ties, contacts andrelationsnecessary to
justify jurisdiction over an lmrclatrri cause of
action. However, regular purchases and training coupled with other contacts, ties and reia-

uons may form the basis for jurisdiction.''
Brief for Respondents 13-14.
Thus, while the respondents' position before this
Court is admittedly less than clear. I believe it is
preferable to address the specific jurisdiction of
the Texas courts because Helicol's contacts with
Texas are in fact related to the underlying cause
of action.
4. The jury specifically found that "the pilot
failed to keep die helicopter under proper control," that "the helicopter was flown into a tree*
top fog condition, whereby the vision of the
pilot was impaired,1* that "such flying was negligence," and that "such negligence ... was a
proximate cause of the crash." See App. 167a168a. On the basis of these findings, Hehcol
was ordered to pay over $1 million in damages
to the respondents,
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under which Texas may assert its I would affirm the judgment of the Supreme Court of Texas.
jurisdictional power.s
Limiting the specific jurisdiction of a forum to cases in which the cause of action
(O |KEYNUM«ISYmM>
formally arose out of the defendant's contacts with the State would subject constitutional standards under the Due Process
Clause to the vagaries of the substantive
law or pleading requirements of each State.
466 VS. 429, 80 I_EcUd 421
For example, the complaint filed against
jjpLinda Sidoti PALMORE, Petitioner
Helicol in this case alleged negligence
v.
based on pilot error. Even though the pilot
was trained in Texas, the Court assumes
Anthony J. SIDOTI.
that the Texas courts may not assert jurisNo. 82-1734.
diction over the suit because the cause of
Argued Feb. 22, 1984.
action "did not 'arise out of/ and [is] not
related to/' that training. See ante, at
Decided April 25, 1984.
1872. If, however, the applicable substantive law required that negligent training of
Father sought custody of parties'
the pilot was a necessary element of a
cause of action for pilot error, or if the daughter by filing petition to modify prior
respondents had simply added an allegation judgment because of changed conditions,
of negligence in the training provided for namely, that mother was then cohabiting
the Helicol pilot, then presumably the with a Negro, whom she later married.
Court would concede that the specific juris- The Florida trial court awarded custody to
diction of the Texas courts was applicable. father, concluding that child's best interOur interpretation of the Due Process ests would be served thereby, and mother
Clause has never been so dependent upon appealed. The Florida District Court of
the applicable substantive law or the Appeal, 426 So.2d 34, affirmed, and certioState's formal pleading requirements. At rari was granted. The Supreme Court,
least since International Shoe Co. v. Chief Justice Burger, held that reality of
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct 154, 90 private biases and possible injury they
LEd. 95 (1945), the principal focus when might inflict were impermissible consideradetermining whether a forum may constitu- tions under equal protection clause for ditionally assert jurisdiction over a nonresi- vesting natural mother of custody of her
dent defendant has been on fairness and infant child because of her remarriage to
reasonableness to the defendant, To this person of different race.
extent, a court's specific jurisdiction should
Reversed.
be applicable whenever the cause of action
Opinion after remand, 472 So.2d 843.
arises out of or relates to the contacts
between the defendant and the forum. It
is enjnently<28 fair and reasonable, in my 1. Constitutional Law *=»215
Racial classifications are subject to
view, to subject a defendant to suit in a
forum with which it has significant con- most exacting scrutiny; to pass constitutacts directly related to the underlying tional muster, they must be justified by
cause of action. Because Helicol's contacts compelling governmental interests and
with the State of Texas meet this standard, must be necessary to accomplishment of its
9L Compare Von Mehren & Trautman. Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79
HarvXJRev. 1121, 1144-1163 (1966). with M l mayer. How Contacts Count: Due Process Limi-

tattoos on State Court Jurisdiction. 1930 S.CL
Rev. 77.80-**. See also Lilly. Jurisdiction Over
Domestic and Alien Defendants, 69 VaXJLev.
S5„ 100-101. and n. 66 (1983).
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KULKO v. SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA IN AND
FOR THE CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO
(HORN, REAL PARTY IN INTEREST)
APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA
No. 77-293. Argued March 29, 1978—Decided May 15, 1978
Appellant and appellee, both then New York doraiciliaries, were married
in 1959 in California during appellant's three-day stopover while he was
en route to overseas military duty. After the marriage, appellee
returned to New York, as did appellant following his tour of duty and a
24-hour stopover in California. In 1961 and 1962 a son and daughter
were born to them in New York, where the family resided together until
March 1972, when appellant and appellee separated. Appellee then
moved to California. Under a separation agreement, executed by both
parties in New York, the children were to remain with appellant father
during the school year but during specified vacations with appellee
mother, whom appellant agreed to pay 13,000 per year in child support
for the periods when the children were in her custody. Appellee, after
obtaining a divorce in Haiti, which incorporated the terms of the
separation agreement, returned to California. In December 1973 the
daughter at her request and with her father's consent joined her mother
in California, and remained there during the school year, spending vacations with her father. Appellee, without appellant's consent, arranged
for the son to join her in California about two years later. Appellee
then brought this action against appellant in California to establish the
Haitian divorce decree as a California judgment, to modify the judgment
so as to award her full custody of the children, and to increase appellant's
child-support obligations. Appellant, resisting the claim for increased
support, appeared specially, claiming that he lacked sufficient "minimum
contacts" with that State under International Shoe Co. v. Washington,
326 U. S. 310, 316, to warrant the State's assertion of personal jurisdiction over him. The California Supreme Court, upholding lower-court
determinations adverse to appellant, concluded that where a nonresident
defendant has caused an "effect" in the State by an act or omission
outside the State, personal jurisdiction over the defendant arising from
the effect may be exercised whenever "reasonable," and that such exercise
was "reasonable" here because appellant had "purposely availed himself
of the benefits and protections of California" by sending the daughter to
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live with her mother there, and that it was "fair and reasonable" for the
defendant to be subject to personal jurisdiction for the support of
both children. Held: The exercise of in personam jurisdiction by the
California courts over appellant, a New York domiciliary, would violate
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The mere act
of sending a child to California to live with her mother connotes no
intent to obtain nor expectancy of receiving a corresponding benefit in
that State that would make fair the assertion of that State's judicial
jurisdiction over appellant. Pp. 91-101.
(a) A defendant to be bound by a judgment against him must "have
certain minimum contacts with [the forum State] such that the
maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice/ " International Shoe Co. v. Washington, supra,
at 316, quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U. S. 457, 463. P. 92.
(b) The acquiescence of appellant in his daughter's desire to live with
her mother in California was not enough to confer jurisdiction over
appellant in the California courts. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U. S
186, 216. P. 94.
(c) Exercise of in personam jurisdiction over appellant was not
warranted by the financial benefit appellant derived from his daughter's
presence in California for nine months of the year, since any diminution
in appellant's household costs resulted not from the child's presence in
California but from her absence from appellant's home, and from
appellee's failure to seek an increase in support payments in New York.
Pp. 94-96.
(d) The "effects" rule that the California courts applied is intended
to reach wrongful activity outside of the forum State causing injury
within the State where such application would not be "unreasonable,"
but here, where there is no claim that appellant visited physical injury
on either property or persons in California; where the cause of action
arises from appellant's personal, domestic relations; and where the
controversy arises from a separation that occurred in New York, and
modification is sought of a contract negotiated and signed in New York
that had virtually no connection with the forum State, it is "unreasonable" for California to assert personal jurisdiction over appellant.
Pp. 96-97.
(e) Since appellant remained in the State of marital domicile and did
no more than acquiesce in the stated preference of his daughter to live
with her mother in California, basic considerations of fairness point
decisively to appellant's State of domicile as the proper forum for
adjudicating this case, whatever be the merits of appellee's underlying
claim. Pp. 97-98.
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(f) California's legitimate interest in ensuring the support of children
residing in California without unduly disrupting the children's lives is
already being served by the State's participation in the Uniform
Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act of 1968, which permits a
California resident claiming support from a nonresident to file a petition
in California and have its merits adjudicated in the State of the alleged
obligor's residence, without either party's having to leave his or her own
State. New York is a signatory to a similar statute. Those statutes
appear to provide appellee with means to vindicate her claimed right to
additional child support from appellant and collection of any support
payments found to be owed to her by appellant. Pp. 98-101.
Appeal dismissed and certiorari granted; 19 Cal. 3d 514, 564 P. 2d 353,
reversed.
MARSHALL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER,
C. J., and

STEWART, BLACKMUN, REHNQUIST, and

STEVENS, JJ.,

joined.

BRENNAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which WHITE and POWELL, JJ.,
joined, post, p. 101.

' Lawrence H. Stotter argued the cause for appellant. With
him on the brief was Edward Schaefler.
Suzie S. Thorn argued the cause for appellee. With her on
the brief was James E. Sutherland.
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The issue before us is whether, in this action for child support, the California state courts may exercise in personam
jurisdiction over a nonresident, nondomiciliary parent of minor
children domiciled within the State. For reasons set forth
below, we hold that the exercise of such jurisdiction would
violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
MR. JUBTICE MARSHALL
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lowing the marriage, Sharon Kulko returned to New York, as
did appellant after his tour of duty. Their first child, Darwin,
was born to the Kulkos in New York in 1961, and a year later
their second child, Ilsa, was born, also in New York. The
Kulkos and their two children resided together as a family in
New York City continuously until March 1972, when the
Kulkos separated.
Following the separation, Sharon Kulko moved to San
Francisco, Cal. A written separation agreement was drawn
up in New York; in September 1972, Sharon Kulko flew
to New York City in order to sign this agreement. The agreement provided, inter alia, that the children would remain with
their father during the school year but would spend their
Christmas, Easter, and summer vacations with their mother.
While Sharon Kulko waived any claim for her own support
or maintenance, Ezra Kulko agreed to pay his wife $3,000 per
year in child support for the periods when the children
were in her care, custody, and control. Immediately after
execution of the separation agreement, Sharon Kulko flew to
Haiti and procured a divorce there;* the divorce decree incorporated the terms of the agreement. She then returned
to California, where she remarried and took the name Horn.
The children resided with appellant during the school year
and with their mother on vacations, as provided by the separation agreement, until December 1973. At this time, just
before Ilsa was to leave New York to spend Christmas vacation
with her mother, she told her father that she wanted to remain in California after her vacation. Appellant bought his
daughter a one-way plane ticket, and Ilsa left, taking her

I
Appellant Ezra Kulko married appellee Sharon Kulko Horn
in 1959, during appellant's three-day stopover in California
en route from a military base in Texas to a tour of duty in
Korea. At the time of this marriage, both parties were domiciled in and residents of New York State. Immediately fol-

1
While the Jurisdictional Statement, at 5, asserts that "the parties" flew
to Haiti, appellant's affidavit submitted in the Superior Court stated that
Sharon Kulko flew to Haiti with a power of attorney signed by appellant.
App. 28. The Haitian decree states that Sharon Kulko appeared "in
person" and that appellant filed a "Power of Attorney and submission to
jurisdiction." Id., at 14.
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clothing with her. Ilsa then commenced living in California
with her mother during the school year and spending vacations
with her father. In January 1976, appellant's other child,
Darwin, called his mother from New York and advised her
that he wanted to live with her in California. Unbeknownst
to appellant, appellee Horn sent a plane ticket to her son,
which he used to fly to California where he took up residence
with his mother and sister.
Less than one month after Darwin's arrival in California,
appellee Horn commenced this action against appellant in the
California Superior Court. She sought to establish the
Haitian divorce decree as a California judgment; to modify
the judgment so as to award her full custody of the children;
and to increase appellant's child-support obligations.* Appellant appeared specially and moved to quash service of the
summons on the ground that he was not a resident of California and lacked sufficient "minimum contacts" with the State
under International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S. 310,316
(1945), to warrant the State's assertion of personal jurisdiction
over him.
The trial court summarily denied the motion to quash, and
appellant sought review in the California Court of Appeal by
petition for a writ of mandate. Appellant did not contest the
court's jurisdiction for purposes of the custody determination,
but, with respect to the claim for increased support, he renewed his argument that the California courts lacked personal
jurisdiction over him. The appellate court affirmed the denial
of appellant's motion to quash, reasoning that, by consenting
to his children's living in California, appellant had "caused

an effect in th [e] state" warranting the exercise of jurisdiction
over him. 133 Cal. Rptr. 627,628 (1976).
The California Supreme Court granted appellant's petition
for review, and in a 4-2 decision sustained the rulings of the
lower state courts. 19 Cal. 3d 514, 564 P. 2d 353 (1977). It
noted first that the California Code of Civil Procedure demonstrated an intent that the courts of California utilize all bases
of in personam jurisdiction "not inconsistent with the Constitution." * Agreeing with the court below, the Supreme
Court stated that, where a nonresident defendant has caused
an effect in the State by an act or omission outside the State,
personal jurisdiction over the defendant in causes arising from
that effect may be exercised whenever "reasonable." Id.,
at 521, 564 P. 2d, at 356. It went on to hold that siich an
exercise was "reasonable" in this case because appellant had
"purposely availed himself of the benefits and protections of
the laws of California" by sending Ilsa to live with her mother
in California. Id., at 521-522, 524, 564 P. 2d, at 356, 358.
While noting that appellant had not, "with respect to his other
child, Darwin, caused an effect in [California] "—since it was
appellee Horn who had arranged for Darwin to fly to California in January 1976—the court concluded that it was "fair and
reasonable for defendant to be subject to personal jurisdiction
for the support of both children, where he has committed acts
with respect to one child which confers [sic] personal jurisdiction and has consented to the permanent residence of the other
child in California." Id., at 525, 564 P. 2d, at 358-359.
In the view of the two dissenting justices, permitting a
minor child to move to California could not be regarded as a

2
Appellee Horn's complaint also sought an order restraining appellant
from removing his children from the State. The trial court immediately
granted appellee temporary custody of the children and restrained both her
and appellant from removing the children from the State of California.
See 19 Cal. 3d 514, 520, 564 P. 2d 353, 355 (1977). The record does not
reflect whether appellant is still enjoined from removing his children from
the State.

•Section 410.10, Cal. Civ. Proc. Code Ann. (West 1973), provides:
"A court of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of the United States."
The opinion below does not appear to distinguish between the requirements
of the Federal and State Constitutions. See 19 Cal. 3d, at 521-522, 564
P. 2d, at 356.
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purposeful act by which appellant had invoked the benefits
and protection of state law. Since appellant had been in the
State of California on only two brief occasions many years
before on military stopovers, and lacked any other contact with
the State, the dissenting opinion argued that appellant could
not reasonably be subjected to the in personam jurisdiction of
the California state courts. Id., at 526-529, 564 P. 2d, at
359-360.
On Ezra Kulko's appeal to this Court, probable jurisdiction
was postponed. 434 U. S. 983 (1977). We have concluded
that jurisdiction by appeal does not lie,4 but, treating the
papers as a petition for a writ of certiorari, we hereby grant
the petition and reverse the judgment below.8
4

As was true in both Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U. S. 235 (1958), and
May v. Anderson, 345 U. S. 528 (1953), this case was improperly brought
to this Court as an appeal, since no state statute was "drawn in question . . . on the ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties
or laws of the United States," 28 U. S. C. § 1257 (2). The jurisdictional
statute construed by the California Supreme Court provides that the
State's jurisdiction is as broad as the Constitution permits. See n. 3,
supra. Appellant did not argue below that this statute was unconstitutional, but instead argued that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment precluded the exercise of in personam jurisdiction over him.
The opinion below does not purport to determine the constitutionality of
the California jurisdictional statute. Rather, the question decided was
whether the Constitution itself would permit the assertion of jurisdiction.
Appellant requested that, in the event that appellate jurisdiction under
28 U. S. C. § 1257 (2) was found lacking, the papers be acted upon as a
petition for certiorari pursuant to 28 U. S. C. §2103. We follow the
practice of both Hanson and May in deeming the papers to be a petition
for a writ of certiorari. As in Hanson and May, moreover, we shall
continue to refer to the parties herein as appellant and appellee to
minimize confusion. See 357 U. S., at 244; 345 U. S., at 530.
8
After the California Supreme Court's decision, appellant sought a
continuance of trial-court proceedings pending this Court's disposition of
his appeal. Appellant's request for a continuance was denied by the trial
court, and subsequently that court determined that appellant was in
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II
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
operates as a limitation on the jurisdiction of state courts to
enter judgments affecting rights or interests of nonresident
defendants. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U. S. 186, 198-200
(1977). It has long been the rule that a valid judgment
imposing a personal obligation or duty in favor of the plaintiff
may be entered only by a court having jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 XJ. S. 714,
732-733 (1878); International Shoe Co. v. Washington,
326 U. S., at 316. The existence of personal jurisdiction, in
turn, depends upon the presence of reasonable notice to the
defendant that an action has been brought, Mullane v. Central
Hanover Trust Co., 339 U. S. 306, 313-314 (1950), and a
sufficient connection between the defendant and the forum
State to make it fair to require defense of the action in the
forum. Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U. S. 457, 463-464 (1940).
In this case, appellant does not dispute the adequacy of the
notice that he received, but contends that his connection with
the State of California is too attenuated, under the standards
implicit in the Due Process Clause of the Constitution, to
justify imposing upon him the burden and inconvenience of
defense in California.
arrears on bis child-support payments. App. to Brief for Appellant ii-iii.
In light of the change in custody arrangements, the court also ordered
that appellant's child-support obligations be increased substantially. Ibid.
Appellee Horn argues that appellant's request for a continuance
amounted to a general appearance and a waiver of jurisdictional objections, and that accordingly there b no longer a live controversy as to the
jurisdictional issue before us. Appellee's argument concerning the jurisdictional effect of a motion for a continuance, however, does not find
support in the California statutes, rules, or cases that she cites. Moreover,
the state trial court expressly determined, subsequent to the request for a
continuance, that appellant had "made a special appearance only to
contest the jurisdiction of the Court." Id., at i. Under these circumstances, appellant's challenge to the state court's ro personam jurisdiction
is not moot.
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The parties are in agreement that the constitutional standard for determining whether the State may enter a binding
judgment against appellant here is that set forth in this
Courts opinion in International Shoe Co. v. Washington,
supra: that a defendant "have certain minimum contacts with
[the forum State] such that the maintenance of the suit does
not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice/ " 326 U. S., at 316, quoting Milliken v. Meyer, supra,
at 463. While the interests of the forum State and of the
plaintiff in proceeding with the cause in the plaintiff's forum
of choice are, of course, to be considered, see McOee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U. S. 220, 223 (1957), an essential
criterion in all cases is whether the "quality and nature" of
the defendant's activity is such that it is "reasonable" and
"fair" to require him to conduct his defense in that State.
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, supra, at 316-317, 319.
Accord, Shaffer v. Heitner, supra, at 207-212; Perkins v. Benguet Mining Co., 342 U. S. 437,445 (1952).
Like any standard that requires a determination of "reasonableness," the "minimum contacts" test of International Shoe
is not susceptible of mechanical application; rather, the facts
of each case must be weighed to determine whether the
requisite "affiliating circumstances" are present. Hanson v.
Denckla, 357 U. S. 235, 246 (1958). We recognize that this
determination is one in which few answers will be written "in
black and white. The greys are dominant and even among
them the shades are innumerable." Estin v. Estin, 334 U. S.
541, 545 (1948). But we believe that the California Supreme
Court's application of the minimum-contacts test in this case
represents an unwarranted extension of International Shoe
and would, if sustained, sanction a result that is neither fair,
just, nor reasonable.
A
In reaching its result, the California Supreme Court did not
rely on appellant's glancing presence in the State some 13
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years before the events that led to this controversy, nor could
it have. Appellant has been in California on only two occasions, once in 1959 for a three-day military stopover on his
way to Korea, see supra, at 86-87, and again in 1960 for a
24-hour stopover on his return from Korean service. To hold
such temporary visits to a State a basis for the assertion of in
personam jurisdiction over unrelated actions arising in the
future would make a mockery of the limitations on state
jurisdiction imposed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Nor did
the California court rely on the fact that appellant was actually
married in California on one of his two brief visits. We agree
that where two New York domiciliaries, for reasons of convenience, marry in the State of California and thereafter
spend their entire married life in New York, the fact of their
California marriage by itself cannot support a California
court's exercise of jurisdiction over a spouse who remains a
New York resident in an action relating to child support.
Finally, in holding that personal jurisdiction existed, the
court below carefully disclaimed reliance on the fact that
appellant had agreed at the time of separation to allow his
children to live with their mother three months a year and
that he had sent them to California each year pursuant to this
agreement. As was noted below, 19 Cal. 3d, at 523-524, 564
P. 2d, at 357, to find personal jurisdiction in a State on this
basis, merely because the mother was residing there, would
discourage parents from entering into reasonable visitation
agreements. Moreover, it could arbitrarily subject one parent
to Buit in any State of the Union where the other parent chose
to spend time while having custody of their offspring pursuant
to a separation agreement.8 As we have emphasized:
"The unilateral activity of those who claim some rela• Although the separation agreement stated that appellee Horn resided in
California and provided that child-support payments would be mailed to
her California address, it also specifically contemplated that appellee might
move to a different State. The agreement directed appellant to mail the
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tionship with a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the
requirement of contact with the forum State. . . .
[I]t
is essential in each case that there be some act by which
the defendant purposefully avails fhim]self of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State . . . . "
Hanson v. Denckla, supra, at 253.
The "purposeful act" that the California Supreme Court
believed did warrant the exercise of personal jurisdiction over
appellant in California was his "actively and fully consent[ing]
to Ilsa living in California for the school year . . . and . . .
8en[ding] her to California for that purpose." 19 Cal. 3d, at
524, 564 P. 2d, at 358. We cannot accept the proposition that
appellant's acquiescence in Ilsa's desire to live with her mother
conferred jurisdiction over appellant in the California courts
in this action. A father who agrees, in the interests of family
harmony and his children's preferences, to allow them to spend
more time in California than was required under a separation
agreement can hardly be said to have "purposefully availed
himself" of the "benefits and protections" of California's laws.
See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U. S., at 216/
Nor can we agree with the assertion of the court below that
the exercise of in personam jurisdiction here was warranted by
the financial benefit appellant derived from his daughter's
presence in California for nine months of the year. 19 Cal.
3d, at 524-525, 564 P. 2d, at 358. This argument rests on the
premise that, while appellant's liability for support payments
support payments to appellee's San Francisco address or "any other
address which the Wife may designate from time to time in writing."
App. 10.
7
The court below stated that the presence in California of appellant's
daughter gave appellant the benefit of California's "police and fire protection, its school system, its hospital services, its recreational facilities, ita
libraries nnd museums . . . ." 19 Cal. 3d, at 522, 564 P. 2d, at 356. But,
in the circumstances presented here, these services provided by the State
were essentially benefits to the child, not the father, and in any event were
not benefits that appellant purposefully sought for himself.
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remained unchanged, his yearly expenses for supporting the
child in New York decreased. But this circumstance, even if
true, does not support California's assertion of jurisdiction
here. Any diminution in appellant's household costs resulted,
not from the child's presence in California, but rather from
her absence from appellant's home. Moreover, an action by
appellee Horn to increase support payments could now be
brought, and could have been brought when Ilsa first moved
to California, in the State of New York; • a New York court
would clearly have personal jurisdiction over appellant and, if
a judgment were entered by a New York court increasing
appellant's child-support obligations, it could properly be
enforced against him in both New York and California.* Any
ultimate financial advantage to appellant thus results not from
the child's presence in California, but from appellee's failure
earlier to seek an increase in payments under the separation
agreement.10 The argument below to the contrary, in our
• Under the separation agreement, appellant is bound to "indemnify and
hold [his] Wife harmless from any and all attorney fees, costs and
expenses which she may incur by reason of the default of [appellant] in
the performance of any of the obligations required to be performed by him
pursuant to the terms and conditions of this agreement." App. 11. To
the extent that appellee Horn seeks arrearages, see n. 5, supra, her
litigation expenses, presumably including any additional costs incurred by
her as a result of having to prosecute the action in New York, would
thus be borne by appellant.
• Afinaljudgment entered by a New York court having jurisdiction over
the defendant's person and over the subject matter of the lawsuit would be
entitled to full faith and credit in any State. See New York ex rel.
Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U. S. 610, 614 (1947). See also Sosna v. Iowa,
419 U.S.393, 407 (1975).
10
It may well be that, as a matter of state law, appellee Horn could still
obtain through New York proceedings additional payments from appellant
for Ilsa's support from January 1974, when a de facto modification of the
custody provisions of the separation agreement took place, until the
present. See H. Clark, Domestic Relations § 15.2, p. 500 (1968); cf. In re
Santa Clara County v. Hughes, 43 Misc. 2d 559,251 N. Y. S. 2d 579 (1964).
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view, confuses the question of appellant's liability with that
of the proper forum in which to determine that liability.
B
In light of our conclusion that appellant did not purposefully derive benefit from any activities relating to the State of
California, it is apparent that the California Supreme Court's
reliance on appellant's having caused an "effect" in California
was misplaced. See supra, at 89. This "effects" test is
derived from the American Law Institute's Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 37 (1971), which provides:
"A state has power to exercise judicial jurisdiction over an
individual who causes effects in the state by an act done
elsewhere with respect to any cause of action arising from
these effects unless the nature of the effects and of the
individual's relationship to the state make the exercise of
such jurisdiction unreasonable."1X
While this provision is not binding on this Court, it does not
in any event support the decision below. As is apparent from
the examples accompanying § 37 in the Restatement, this section was intended to reach wrongful activity outside of the
State causing injury within the State, see, e. g., Comment a,
p. 157 (shooting bullet from one State into another), or
commercial activity affecting state residents, ibid. Even in
such situations, moreover, the Restatement recognizes that
there might be circumstances that would render "unreasonable" the assertion of jurisdiction over the nonresident
defendant.
The circumstances in this case clearly render "unreasonable"
California's assertion of personal jurisdiction. There is no
claim that appellant has visited physical injury on either
11

Section 37 of the Restatement has effectively been incorporated into
California law. See Judicial Council Comment (9) to Cal. Civ. Proc. Code
Ann. §410.10 (West 1973).

84

97

Opinion of the Court

property or persons within the State of California. Cf. Hess
v. Pawloski, 274 U. S. 352 (1927). The cause of action
herein asserted arises, not from the defendant's commercial
transactions in interstate commerce, but rather from his
personal, domestic relations. It thus cannot be said that
appellant has sought a commercial benefit from solicitation
of business from a resident of California that could reasonably render him liable to suit in state court; appellant's
activities cannot fairly be analogized to an insurer's sending
an insurance contract and premium notices into the State
to an insured resident of the State. Cf. McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., 355 U. S. 220 (1957). Furthermore, the controversy between the parties arises from a separation that occurred in the State of New York; appellee Horn
seeks modification of a contract that was negotiated in New
York and that she flew to New York to sign. As in Hanson v.
Denckla, 357 U. S., at 252, the instant action involves an
agreement that was entered into with virtually no connection
with the forum State. See also n. 6, supra.
Finally, basic considerations of fairness point decisively in
favor of appellant's State of domicile as the proper forum for
adjudication of this case, whatever the merits of appellee's
underlying claim. It is appellant who has remained in the
State of the marital domicile, whereas it is appellee who has
moved across the continent. Cf. May v. Anderson, 345 U. S.
528, 534-535, n. 8 (1953). Appellant has at all times resided
in New York State, and, until the separation and appellee's
move to California, his entire family resided there as well. As
noted above, appellant did no more than acquiesce in the
stated preference of one of his children to live with her mother
in California. This single act is surely not one that a reasonable parent would expect to result in the substantial financial
burden and personal strain of litigating a child-support suit in
a forum 3,000 miles away, and we therefore see no basis on
which it can be said that appellant could reasonably have
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anticipated being "haled before a [California] court," Shaffer
v. Heitner, 433 U. S., at 216." To make jurisdiction in a case
such as this turn on whether appellant bought his daughter
her ticket or instead unsuccessfully sought to prevent her
departure would impose an unreasonable burden on family
relations, and one wholly unjustified by the "quality and
nature" of appellant's activities in or relating to the State of
California. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S.,
at 319.
Ill
In seeking to justify the burden that would be imposed on
appellant were the exercise of in personam jurisdiction in
California sustained, appellee argues that California has substantial interests in protecting the welfare of its minor residents and in promoting to the fullest extent possible a healthy
and supportive family environment in which the children of
the State are to be raised. These interests are unquestionably
important. But while the presence of the children and one
parent in California arguably might favor application of California law in a lawsuit in New York, the fact that California
may be the " 'center of gravity*" for choice-of-law purposes
does not mean that California has personal jurisdiction over
the defendant. Hanson v. Denckla, supra, at 254. And California has not attempted to assert any particularized interest
in trying such cases in its courts by, e. g., enacting a special
jurisdictional statute. Cf. McGee v. International Life Ins.
Co., supra, at 221, 224.
California's legitimate interest in ensuring the support of
children resident in California without unduly disrupting the
children's lives, moreover, is already being served by the State's
participation in the Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement
of Support Act of 1968. This statute provides a mechanism
,f

See also Developments in the Law—State-Court Jurisdiction, 73
Harv. L. Rev. 909, 911 (1960).
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for communication between court systems in different States,
in order to facilitate the procurement and enforcement of
child-support decrees where the dependent children reside in a
State that cannot obtain personal jurisdiction over the defendant. California's version of the Act essentially permits a
California resident claiming support from a nonresident to file
a petition in California and have its merits adjudicated in the
State of the alleged obligor's residence, without either party's
having to leave his or her own State. Cal. Civ. Proo. Code
Ann. § 1650 et seq. (West 1972 and Supp. 1978)." New York
State is a signatory to a similar Act." Thus, not only may
"In addition to California, 24 other States are signatories to this Act.
9 U. L. A. 473 (Supp. 1978). Under the Act, an "obligee" may file a
petition in a court of his or her State (the "initiating court") to obtain
support. 9 U. L. A. §§11, 14 (1973). If the court "finds that the
[petition] sets forth facts from which it may be determined that the
obligor owes a duty of support and that a court of the responding state
may obtain jurisdiction of the obligor or his property," it may send a copy
of the petition to the "responding state." § 14. This has the effect of
requesting the responding State "to obtain jurisdiction over the obligor."
§ 18 (b). If jurisdiction is obtained, then a hearing is set in a court in the
responding State at which the obligor may, if he chooses, contest the claim.
The claim may be litigated in that court, with deposition testimony
submitted through the initiating court by the initiating spouse or other
party. § 20. If the responding state court finds that the obligor owes a
duty of support pursuant to the laws of the State where he or she was
present during the time when support was sought, § 7, judgment for the
petitioner is entered. § 24. If the money is collected from the spouse in
the responding State, it is then sent to the court in the initiating State for
distribution to the initiating party. § 28.
14
While not a signatory to the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of
Support Act of 1968, New York is a party to the Uniform Reciprocal
Enforcement of Support Act of 1950, as amended. N. Y. Dom. Rel. Law
§ 30 et seq. (McKinney 1977) (Uniform Support of Dependents Law). By
1957 this Act, or its substantial equivalent, had been enacted in all States,
organized Territories, and the District of Columbia. 9 U. L. A. 885
(1973). The "two-state" procedure in the 1950 Act for obtaining and
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plaintiff-appellee here vindicate her claimed right to additional
child support from her former husband in a New York court,
see supra, at 95, but also the Uniform Acts will facilitate
both her prosecution of a claim for additional support and collection of any support payments found to be owed by
appellant."
It cannot be disputed that California has substantial
interests in protecting resident children and in facilitating
child-support actions on behalf of those children. But these
interests simply do not make California a "fair forum,"
Shaffer v. Heitner, supra, at 215, in which to require appellant, who derives no personal or commercial benefit from
his child's presence in California and who lacks any other
enforcing support obligations owed by a spouse in one State to a spouse
in another is similar to (hat provided in the 1968 Act. See n. 13, supra.
See generally Note, 48 Cornell L. Q. 541 (1963).
In Landes v. Landes, 1 N. Y. 2d 358, 135 N. E. 2d 562, appeal dismissed, 352 U. S. 948 (1956), the court upheld a support decree entered
against a divorced husband living in New York, on a petition filed by his
former wife in California pursuant to the Uniform Act. No prior support
agreement or decree existed between the parties; the California spouse
sought support from the New York husband for the couple's minor child,
who was residing with her mother in California. The New York Court of
Appeals concluded that the procedures followed—filing of a petition in
California, followed by its certification to New York's Family Court, the
obtaining of jurisdiction over the husband, a hearing in New York on the
merits of the petition, and entry of an award—were proper under the laws
of both States and were constitutional. The constitutionality of these procedures has also been upheld in other jurisdictions. See, e. g., Watson v.
Dreadin, 309 A. 2d 493 (DC 1973), cert, denied, 415 U. S. 959 (1974);
State ex rel. Terry v. Terry, 80 N. M. 185, 453 P. 2d 206 (1969); Harmon
v. Harmon, 184 Cal. App. 2d 245, 7 Cal. Rptr. 279 (1960), appeal dismissed and cert, denied, 366 U. S. 270 (1961).
15
Thus, it cannot here be concluded, as it was in McGee v. International
Life Insurance Co., 355 U. S. 220,223-224 (1957), with respect to actions on
insurance contracts, that resident plaintiffs would be at a "severe disadvantage" if in personam jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants were
sometimes unavailable.
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relevant contact with the State, either to defend a childsupport suit or to suffer liability by default.
IV
We therefore believe that the state courts in the instant case
failed to heed our admonition that "the flexible standard of
International Shoe" does not "heraltd] the eventual demise
of all restrictions on the personal jurisdiction of state courts/'
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U. S., at 251. In McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., we commented on the extension of in
personam jurisdiction under evolving standards of due process, explaining that this trend was in large part "attributable
to the . . . increasing nationalization of commerce . . . [accompanied by] modern transportation and communication [that]
have made it much less burdensome for a party sued to defend
himself in a State where he engages in economic activity."
355 U. S., at 222-223. But the mere act of sending a child to
California to live with her mother is not a commercial act and
connotes no intent to obtain or expectancy of receiving a corresponding benefit in the State that would make fair the assertion of that State's judicial jurisdiction.
Accordingly, we conclude that the appellant's motion to
quash service, on the ground of lack of personal jurisdiction,
was erroneously denied by the California courts. The judgment of the California Supreme Court is, therefore,
Reversed.
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom MR. JUSTICE WHITE
and MR. JUSTICE POWELL join, dissenting.
The Court properly treats this case as presenting a single
narrow question. That question is whether the California
Supreme Court correctly "weighed" "the facts," ante, at 92, of
this particular case in applying the settled "constitutional
standard," ibid., that before state courts may exercise in
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personam jurisdiction over a nonresident, nondomiciliary parent of minor children domiciled in the State, it must appear
that the nonresident has "certain minimum contacts [with the
forum State] such that the maintenance of the suit does not
offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice/ " International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S. 310,
316 (1945). The Court recognizes that "this determination is
one in which few answers will be written 'in blade and white/ "
ante, at 92. I cannot say that the Court's determination
against state-court in personam jurisdiction is implausible,
but, though the issue is close, my independent weighing of the
facts leads me to conclude, in agreement with the analysis and
determination of the California Supreme Court, that appellant's connection with the State of California was not too
attenuated, under the standards of reasonableness and fairness implicit in the Due Process Clause, to require him to
conduct his defense in the California courts. I therefore
dissent.
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SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION v.
SLOAN
CERTIORARI. TO T H E UNITED 8TATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

No. 75-1607. Argued March 27-28, 1978—Decided May 15, 1978
The Securities and Exchange Commission (Commission) has the authority
under § 12 (k) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Act) "summarily
to suspend trading in any security . . . for a period not exceeding ten
days" if "in its opinion the public interest and the protection of investors
so require." Acting pursuant to § 12 (k) and its predecessor, the Commission issued a series of summary 10-day orders continuously suspending trading in the common stock of a certain corporation for over a year.
Respondent, who owned 13 shares of the stock and who had engaged
in substantial purchases and 6hort sales of shares of the stock, filed a
petition pursuant to the Act in the Court of Appeals for n review of the
orders, contending, inter alia, that the "tacking" of the 10-day summary
suspension orders exceeded the Commission's authority under § 12 (k).
Because shortly after the suit was brought no suspension order remained
in effect and the Commission asserted that it had no plans to issue such
orders in the foreseeable future, the Commission claimed that the case
was moot. The court rejected that claim and upheld respondent's position on the merits. In this Court, the Commission contends that the
facts on the record are inadequate to allow a proper resolution of the
mootness issue and that in any event it has the authority to issue consecutive 10-day sum man' suspension orders. Held:
1. The case is not moot, since it is "capable of repetition, yet evading
review," Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U. S. 498, 515.
Effective judicial review is precluded during the life of the orders because
a series of consecutive suspension orders may last no more than 20 days.
In view of the numerous violations ascribed to the corporation involved,
there is a reasonable probability that its stock will again be subjected
to consecutive summary suspension orders; thus, there is a "reasonable expectation that the same complaining party" will be subjected to
the same action again. Cf. Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U. S. 147. Pp.
108-110.
2. The Commission does not have the authority under § 12 (k), based
upon a single set of circumstances, to issue a series of summary orders
that would suspend trading in a stock beyond the initial 10-day period,

